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Introduction 
Setting the scene 
Human egg cells, or oocytes, are exceptional in both their trajectory throughout a 
woman’s life and in their properties. According to the famous Wallace-Kelsey model of 
ovarian reserve throughout life, thousands to millions of non-growing follicles are 
produced in the ovaries of developing female foetuses in the first half of the pregnancy. 
This number remains relatively stable throughout the second half of the pregnancy and 
girls are born with an average of 295,000 follicles (with a very wide range, from 35,000 to 
2,500,000). After birth, the number of follicles (or ‘ovarian reserve’) immediately starts a 
steep decline (note that the Y-axis of the graph below is exponential).  
Illustrative example of non-growing follicle populations predicted by the Wallace-
Kelsey model, @ 2010, Wallace, Kelsey 
Even before puberty starts, most follicles are lost. At age 25, women are estimated to have 
an average of 65,000 follicles left, at age 35 16,000. At age 40, only 3% of the original 
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ovarian reserve remains. Women enter menopause at the average age of 50 years, again 
with a very wide range (Wallace and Kelsey, 2010).  
The end of fertility, however, does not coincide with the complete depletion of the 
ovarian reserve. Most women are subfertile or infertile at least a decade before entering 
into menopause. The main cause for age-related subfertility is not the decline in the 
quantity of germ cells, but rather a decline in the quality of these cells due to oocyte aging, 
leading to decreased fertilization rates, polyspermy, digyny, parthenogenesis, 
chromosomal abnormalities, apoptosis, structural alteration and hardening of the zona 
pellucida, epigenetic changes and others (Miao et al, 2009). As illustrated by the high rates 
of healthy live births after egg donation, aging of the uterus is not a major contributor to 
age-related subfertility. 
As oocyte quality and – in second instance – oocyte quantity are to blame for age-related 
subfertility, the obvious ‘solution’ would be to store young, healthy oocytes early in life, 
in case a woman would want to reproduce after the end of her natural reproductive 
lifespan. However, this is where the exceptional properties of human egg cells surface. 
Mature oocytes have a diameter of about 0,1 mm and contain a large amount of fluid, 
making them notoriously difficult to freeze (or cryopreserve). Although the first healthy 
live birth from a frozen human egg cell dates back to 1986, egg freezing has long been so 
inefficient that it was hardly considered a valid treatment option (Gook, 2011). From 2004 
onwards, however, there is a clear explosion in research directed at oocyte 
cryopreservation (OC), as illustrated by the sharp increase in published studies on this 
subject.  
 
  
This research effort led to improvements in both the method known as slow freezing and 
in vitrification or ultra-rapid freezing, in which the oocyte acquires a glass-like state. This 
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increase in research efforts (unsurprisingly) coincides with the introduction of the very 
restrictive and controversial Italian law 40/2004, regulating assisted reproduction in 
Italy. This law stipulated that IVF embryos could no longer be cryopreserved and that all 
created embryos (with a maximum of three) should be transferred in the first cycle 
(Boggio, 2005). Much is to be said about this law, but here it suffices to say that Italian 
practitioners in the field of ART had to resort to the experimental technique of oocyte 
freezing in order to ‘rescue’ the oocytes that could not be used in the first, fresh cycle and 
avoid repeated hormonal treatments and laparoscopies (Manna & Nardo, 2005). This 
undoubtedly contributed to a fast development and adoption of new cryopreservation 
techniques.  
With improvements in both the slow freezing technique and ultra-rapid cooling by 
vitrification, oocyte cryopreservation has, since a couple of years, become an efficient 
procedure with high survival rates after thawing and with reassuring preliminary data 
on the health of the resulting offspring (Cobo et al, 2008; Noyes et al, 2009; Noyes et al, 
2010; Almodin et al., 2010; Grifo and Noyes, 2010; Rienzi et al., 2010; Trokoudes et al., 2011; 
Cobo et al, 2014; De Munck et al, 2015). These advancements have given a boost to the 
field of oncofertility, providing fertility preservation for oncology patients. If their 
treatment permits it, women who are at risk of losing their fertility due to cancer, cancer 
treatment or other grave illnesses are now given the option of storing oocytes (rather 
than embryos) before starting cancer treatment.  
However, not only cancer patients are at risk of losing their fertility, but all women in 
their late thirties are and many of them still have a desire for parenthood. When looking 
at the first world countries, there has been a steady increase of women’s age at first 
childbirth in the last five decades. The introduction of effective contraception, an 
increase in women’s education and labour marked participation, value changes, gender 
equity, partnership changes, housing conditions, economic uncertainty and the absence 
of supportive family policies have been identified as causes for this trend (Mills et al, 
2011). This ‘postponement’ of motherhood is linked to a higher rate of involuntary 
childlessness and smaller family sizes than desired due to increased infertility and fetal 
death with higher age (Smith et al, 2012). Also, the number of women faced with age-
related infertility who rely on donor oocytes to conceive is rising steadily (Stoop et al, 
2014a). Therefore, also for healthy women who desire to have children, but who fear to 
be faced with age related subfertility by the time they want to conceive a child, OC could 
be beneficial. However, whereas the introduction of OC – even with the experimental 
technique of vitrification – for oncofertility was met with much enthusiasm and 
optimism, the expansion of the option of OC for ‘medical reasons’ to OC for ‘non-medical 
reasons’, ‘social reasons’ or ‘anticipated gamete exhaustion’ (AGE-banking) (Stoop et al, 
2014b) did not incite the same reactions. In 2008, the American Society for Reproductive 
Medicine (ASRM) stated that:  
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“Oocyte cryopreservation is an experimental procedure that should not be offered 
or marketed as a means to defer reproductive aging, primarily because data relating 
to clinical outcomes are limited. […] However, unlike healthy women, [women with 
cancer or other illnesses requiring immediate treatments that seriously threaten 
their future fertility] may have no viable options and therefore may be appropriate 
candidates for such treatment despite its experimental status” (ASRM, 2008, p. 
S134).  
The European Society for Human Reproduction and Embryology (ESHRE) took a similar 
stand:  
“In view of the lack of success and clinical applications in the case of ovarian tissue, 
this application should not be offered to women as a means to preserve their 
fertility potential when there is no immediate threat to their fertility. According to 
similar reasoning, oocyte freezing for fertility preservation without a medical 
indication should not be encouraged.” (ESHRE, 2004, p. 461).  
Given the rapid developments in the years that followed, several authors have called 
directly upon ASRM and ESHRE for a less restrictive attitude (Homburg et al. 2009; Rybak 
and Lieman 2009). This resulted in a revision of the ESHRE-guidelines in 2012, now stating 
that: 
 “[i]n the light of new scientific developments, and after considering relevant 
ethical arguments […] oocyte cryopreservation to improve prospects of future child 
bearing should also be available for non-medical reasons” (ESHRE, 2012, p. 1231).  
The ASRM, however, despite lifting the ‘experimental’ label from OC for medical purposes 
in 2012, maintained its stance that OC should not be offered for non-medical reasons due 
to a lack of data for this specific indication and due to the fact that: 
 “[m]arketing this technology for the purpose of deferring childbearing may give 
women false hope and encourage women to delay childbearing” (ASRM, 2012, p. 41).   
An Israelian study from 2011, surveying both ‘experts’ in ART and in bioethics and 
laypersons about their attitudes towards AGE banking found a significant discrepancy in 
acceptance. Whereas 80% of experts reported that they feel OC should be allowed for 
‘personal (non-medical) reasons’, only 56% of medical students and 40% of the general 
population had a similar attitude (Brezis et al, 2011). Regardless of acceptance rates, 
demand for AGE banking is rising steadily. Cobo et al (2016), for example, report a fivefold 
increase in demand in the past 8 years. 
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Central questions and structure of this thesis 
This thesis presents critical ethical reflection on the practice of oocyte cryopreservation 
for healthy women. It tackles the following four normative questions:  
 
 Should we freeze the eggs of women who fear that age-related fertility decline will 
interfere with their reproductive plans? (chapters 1 and 2) 
 How should we freeze eggs for these women? (chapter 3) 
 Who should pay the bill? (chapters 4 and 5) 
 Can egg banking also be considered as a solution to ethical problems in the context 
of egg donation? (chapter 6) 
 
To frame the first question, an analysis is made of how different stereotypes influence the 
different responses that have been given. Keeping the dangers of these stereotypes in 
mind, an inventory is then made of arguments for and against egg freezing for healthy 
women, resulting in the conclusion that there are no prima facie reasons to prohibit the 
offer of OC to healthy women.  
However, a cautious approach is advocated. Even though the introduction of OC for 
healthy women in the clinic is not necessarily ethically problematic, it can result in 
unethical practices. The second part of this thesis therefore sets out guidelines for a 
proper introduction.  
One aspect that is discussed separately in the third part is the issue of financing. 
Depending on how OC for healthy women is conceptualised (self-donation, prevention, 
social egg freezing, …), it is either self-evident or counterintuitive to treat it in the same 
way as other interventions in reproductive medicine. In the first chapter of part III the 
options and rationales for and against public funding are discussed. In the second chapter, 
the issue of companies offering OC to their employees as a healthcare benefit is discussed.  
The final chapter looks at the future impact of OC for/by healthy women. It is to be 
expected that many women will not use their stored oocytes and might consider donating 
them to people who are subfertile. Also, ‘freeze and share’ agreements may be possible in 
which a women’s oocytes are retrieved both for future autologous use and for donation. 
Important elements in the ‘traditional’ ethical deliberations regarding oocyte donation 
are the fact that healthy women are subjected to potentially harmful procedures and the 
issue of reimbursement. Both these issues become very different when the primary 
objective of oocyte retrieval is (also) beneficial for the donor. 
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Methodology 
My modus operandi was not the same for each of the articles in this thesis, but in general, 
there are seven steps that have led up to the ethical analyses in this dissertation: (1) 
identification of a moral concern; (2) study of the facts necessary to understand the 
concern; (3) inventarisation of the arguments used to support or reject positions in regard 
to the moral concern involved; (4) extention of this inventory with possible additional 
arguments which are relevant from a moral perspective, but have not yet been voiced; (5) 
critical analysis of the arguments presented in (3) and (4), focussing on consistency with 
scientific facts, internal consistency, consistency with related practices and on 
argumentative flaws; (6) a conclusion bringing the strongest arguments together and (7) 
when appropriate, the formulation of recommendations about possible ‘solutions’ or 
preferred courses of action.  
This methodology can be labelled as a version of critical applied ethics, an approach 
described by Molewijk et al (2004) and further elaborated by Leget, Borry and De Vries 
(2009), which integrates empirical research with normative research and considers “the 
empirical and the normative as two independent focuses of the ellipse that is called 
bioethics” (Leget et al, p.231). The method as described by the latter authors involves five 
stages:  
(a) the determination of the problem. In my case, the first starting point was the 
observation that a distinction was made between the application of oocyte 
cryopreservation for (so-called) medical reasons and for (so-called) social reasons, linked 
to a different value judgement.  
(b) the description of the problem. This includes a critical look at the vocabulary used and 
of the claims made, which was very much needed in my research, as ‘social egg freezing’, 
‘fertility preservation’, ‘fertility insurance’, ‘lifestyle choices’ and related terms are not 
value-free. Also the incorporation of empirical data on the profiles of the women who are 
interested in oocyte cryopreservation (for example to determine whether these profiles 
match the portrayals of these women) is an illustration of this step. 
(c) effects and alternatives. Especially for this phase empirical data are of central 
importance to my analyses (the odds of achieving a pregnancy after egg freezing, risks of 
ovarian stimulation, psychological impact of egg freezing etc), although for some issues 
hypothetical effects and alternatives were also discussed, for example in chapters 4 (What 
are the alternative funding options and which impact might they have?) and 6 (Which 
impact might company-sponsored egg freezing have on the women?). 
(d) the normative weighing. As Leget et al mention, this is where “we enter the very heart 
of normative ethics” (Leget et al, 2009; blz 233). Although I rely heavily on empirical 
research, this dissertation itself is not empirical, but normative. 
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(e) evaluation of the effects of a decision… because “bioethics is a never-ending process of 
evaluation and re-evaluation” (Leget et al, 2009; p 233). 
Two important clarifications are needed in regard to my position towards critical applied 
ethics. First, I do not generate empirical data myself, but rely on empirical data that are 
present in the literature. Literature from different disciplines was gathered: medical 
research dealing with, for example, the technical aspects of slow freezing and vitrification 
or with the chances of conception at different ages; demographic research about, for 
example, the age at first childbirth; sociological research about the profile of women who 
present themselves for oocyte cryopreservation or about the impact of employment 
situations on fertility, psychological research about the impact of childlessness, et cetera. 
These empirical sources were supplemented by a great deal of literature concerning 
bioethical and philosophical issues such as reproductive liberty, autonomy, distributive 
justice, justice in healthcare, resource allocation, et cetera. Next to academic literature, 
also statements issued by regulators and professional societies were picked up, as were 
media reports. This last category was very important for chapter 1, in which I aimed to 
investigate the validity of the different discourses regarding healthy women 
cryopreserving their eggs. 
Second, the method of critical applied ethics as described by Leget et al (2009) focuses on 
integration of the empirical with ethical theories. In my case, this should be interpreted 
to also include integration with ethical principles and other, more straightforward cases. 
This means that I incorporate principlism and arguing by analogy, supplemented with a 
focus on sound argumentation, that is, devoid from argumentative flaws and focussed on 
consistency (Mertes & Pennings, 2011). The most convincing description of my 
methodology is therefore the wide reflective equilibrium (Daniels, 1996). The method of 
reflective equilibrium consists in working back and forth among our considered 
judgments (or “intuitions”) about particular instances or cases, the principles or rules 
that we believe govern them, and the theoretical considerations that we believe bear on 
accepting these considered judgments, principles, or rules, revising any of these elements 
wherever necessary in order to achieve an acceptable coherence among them. This model 
is especially suitable for the normative evaluation of an on-going field of research – such 
as oocyte cryopreservation – as the reflective equilibrium that is achieved can be 
constantly challenged by new advances in science and may be modified as new elements 
arise in our thinking (Schroeter, 2004). Although the method of reflective equilibrium is 
thus not a method of achieving some kind of normative ‘truth’, it does provide an 
important tool for justification (Daniels, 2011). Moreover, this method acknowledges that 
normative conclusions are always provisional. 
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Terminology 
In the debate regarding oocyte cryopreservation in anticipation of age related fertility 
decline, several terms have been used to describe the procedure. Unfortunately most of 
these terms also have a normative connotation and/or incorporate presuppositions that 
are not necessarily well founded. As the choice of words is not innocent in ethical debates, 
I will go over the most important ones and indicate why I have chosen to use ‘AGE 
banking’ in this dissertation. 
Fertility preservation is a general term referring to all measures that are taken to 
enable people to reproduce after losing their ability to reproduce naturally. It is not used 
exclusively in anticipation of fertility decline due to aging, but more frequently in the 
context of premature subfertility and infertility after a disease or medical treatment (with 
the field of oncofertility focussing specifically on cancer). Fertility preservation measures 
include storage of egg cells and sperm cells, but also of embryos, ovarian and testicular 
tissue, or the transposition of ovaries during irradiation therapy. This term can be 
criticised on the basis of the fact that fertility is only potentially and partly ‘preserved’, 
as there is no guarantee that the intervention will eventually lead to a healthy live birth. 
At the same time, fertility preservation measures can make the crucial difference 
between having no chance whatsoever to reproduce, and still having ‘a’ chance of 
reproducing, even if fertility is in much worse shape than it would have been, had the 
person not had a disease, undergone a treatment or aged. 
Social egg freezing is a widely used term, both in the academic literature and in the 
popular media. It is usually used in a dichotomy with ‘medical egg freezing’, to indicate 
that the reason for cryopreserving oocytes is not a disease or medical treatment, but 
rather a set of social circumstances. It oftentimes has a pejorative connotation, in the 
sense that social reasons for egg freezing are seen as less legitimate than medical reasons. 
It – deliberately or not – resonates the argument that we should not use medical 
interventions to solve social problems (see below in chapters 1 and 2). As will be discussed 
in the coming chapters, the dichotomy between medical and social indications for egg 
freezing is arbitrary and this term reflects stereotypes that are not representative for the 
actual practice. 
Non-medical egg freezing is less judgemental than social egg freezing, but it still 
departs from a clear distinction between medical and non-medical indications. Note that 
we do not call other age-related health problems (e.g. osteoporosis, bad eyesight, hearing 
problems) non-medical problems. The fact that this term is used here (while we do not 
say that our grandmother wears eyeglasses for non-medical reasons), hints at a 
normative difference between medical and non-medical egg freezing, which I would like 
to problematize, rather than adopt. 
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Elective egg freezing steps away from the dichotomy between medical and non-
medical/social egg freezing, but implies that whereas for healthy women it is a deliberate 
choice to store eggs, an option they choose between a number of other options, this would 
not be the case for women freezing their eggs in the context of oncofertility (presuming 
that in this case it is a necessity, their only choice). In both cases, however, egg banking 
is not a part of some bigger life plan, it is rather a plan B to save any reproductive potential 
that can be saved given the suboptimal position a woman is in. As will be discussed in the 
coming chapters (especially chapters 1, 2 and 3), egg banking in order to purposefully 
‘postpone’ childbearing is rare.  
Egg banking in anticipation of age-related fertility decline is my preferred 
terminology, but unfortunately not very practical to use. This however describes best 
which group of women I am referring to in this dissertation. 
AGE banking, whereby AGE is an acronym for ‘anticipated gamete exhaustion’ is the 
term that I will use throughout this dissertation. It was coined and extensively explained 
by Stoop et al in 2014 and refers to several relevant elements: the anticipation of 
infertility, aging and banking/storing eggs. I am aware that the ‘banking’ metaphor is not 
devoid of normativity. On the one hand it makes clear that egg banking is about 
temporarily putting them in a repository, where they can later be collected by the same 
person who deposited them. On the other hand, a bank may lead to connotations of 
money and trade, which is not what I would want to reinforce. I hope it will be clear to 
the readers that ‘banking’ should be read as synonymous for ‘storing’ and that the 
connotation with trade and commercialisation is unintended. 
Importance 
According to ethicists Hayry and Takala “it is the job of philosophers to provide 
conceptual analyses of arguments, views, decisions, doctrines, policies, and, in general, of 
anything related to values, norms, duties, virtues, rights, liberties, and any number of 
entities and notions referred to or employed in moral and political discussions.” (2014). 
When I published the first articles from this dissertation in 2011, there was hardly any 
literature in the field of bioethics focussing on the topic of oocyte cryopreservation for 
healthy women. Although it was already technically possible, the introduction in the 
clinic was not yet widespread and many centres for reproductive medicine were 
struggling with the question whether or not to limit the offer of oocyte cryopreservation 
to cancer patients and other patients whose fertility was threatened by illness or medical 
treatments. The first responses to oocyte cryopreservation as a preventive measure for 
healthy women, whose fertility was ‘merely’ threatened by aging, were rather negative. 
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At the time, both slow freezing and vitrification were experimental procedures of which 
not even short term outcome data were available. This instigated reluctance of 
introducing it into the clinic, which is in principle a desirable attitude. Yet, the fact that 
the safety of the procedure was not established, cannot be a reason to offer it to one group 
of patients, but not the other. One can even argue that a less vulnerable group of 
participants in the first clinical trials would be more appropriate than a more vulnerable 
group, also taking into account that cancer treatment was sometimes delayed because of 
the time needed for ovarian stimulation and that there was a lot of uncertainty over the 
effects of ovarian stimulation on several malignancies. Thus, ethical reflection was called 
for. I am optimistic that my work has had a valued impact on the field. The five articles 
that are included in this manuscript (published between 2011 and 2013) have at present 
been cited almost 120 times, of which 49 times in articles indexed in the Web of Science. 
Articles and book chapters in this dissertation 
Mertes H, Pennings G. Social egg freezing: for better, not for worse. Reproductive 
BioMedicine Online 2011;23:824-829. (Reprinted in Fertility Magazine 2013;15:40-
45.) 
Mertes H, Pennings G. Elective oocyte cryopreservation: who should pay? Human 
Reproduction 2011;27:9-13. 
Mertes H, Pennings G, Dondorp W, de Wert G. Implications of oocyte cryostorage for the 
practice of oocyte donation. Human Reproduction 2012;27:2886-2893. 
Mertes H. The portrayal of healthy women requesting oocyte cryopreservation. Facts, 
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Mertes H. Does company-sponsored egg freezing promote or confine women’s 
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Should we freeze healthy women’s eggs? 
Pros and cons in arguments and narratives 
 
  
Chapter 1  
The portrayal of healthy women requesting oocyte 
cryopreservation 
Abstract:  
The possibility to cryopreserve oocytes to be used in IVF treatment later in life has 
not only enlarged the reproductive options of cancer patients who are faced with 
gonadotoxic treatments, but also holds the promise of enlarging the reproductive 
options of healthy women whose personal circumstances (most often the absence 
of a partner) do not allow them to reproduce in their most fertile years. Opinions 
for and against this application of the cryopreservation technology are often based 
on different portrayals of the women who might use it. Three different portrayals 
can be discerned in the debate about the ethics of so-called ‘social egg freezing’ or 
‘non medical egg freezing’. First, these women have been portrayed as selfish 
career-pursuing women. Second, healthy women who might benefit from oocyte 
cryopreservation have been portrayed as victims of a male-oriented society that 
makes it difficult for women to combine motherhood with a good education or 
professional responsibilities. Third, healthy women opting to cryopreserve oocytes 
have been portrayed as wise, proactive women who will not have to depend on 
oocyte donors should they suffer from age-related infertility by the time they are 
ready to reproduce. Each of these three portrayals has its own shortcomings that 
one should be wary of, as they lead to an oversimplification of the ethical debate. 
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1.1 Introduction 
Although the first report of a live birth from a frozen oocyte dates back to 1986 (Chen, 
1986), oocytes have long been notoriously difficult to cryopreserve. However, following 
advancements in slow freezing and especially since the introduction of vitrification, the 
survival rates of oocytes after thawing have risen significantly. In combination with ICSI, 
good fertilization rates are achieved, making oocyte cryopreservation an efficient 
procedure (Rienzi, 2010). As safety data are also reassuring (although long term follow-
up data are not yet available), it is now considered both safe and efficient enough for 
routine clinical application by many (Cobo et al, 2010; Noyes, 2010; Rienzi et al, 2010; 
Rienzi et al, 2012; Cobo et al, 2014; De Munck et al, 2015).  
The possibility to cryopreserve oocytes to be used in IVF treatment later in life has 
enlarged the reproductive options of cancer patients who are faced with gonadotoxic 
treatments. It also holds the promise of expanding the reproductive options of healthy 
women whose personal circumstances (most often the absence of a partner) do not allow 
them to reproduce in their most fertile years. However, this latter possibility has been 
criticized my many and also professional bodies such as the ASRM and ESHRE were 
initially reluctant to support this particular application (ASRM, 2007; ESHRE, 2004). 
Objections that were voiced included the experimental status of vitrification, the fact that 
expanding the reproductive lifespan is unnatural and represents an unwarranted 
medicalization of reproduction and that it would lead to an unwelcome increase in the 
age of mothers (Jones, 2009; Martin, 2010; Mc Cullough, 2004; Shkedi-Rafid and Hashiloni-
Dolev, 2011). These concerns will be addressed in chapter 2.  
However, part of the debate was not based on fundamental objections, but rather on more 
emotionally charged arguments and prejudices, led by stereotyping of the healthy 
women who might request oocyte cryopreservation. Three different portrayals can be 
discerned in the debate about the ethics of so-called ‘social egg freezing’ or ‘non medical 
egg freezing’ (Martin, 2010). First, these women have been portrayed as selfish career-
pursuing women, which leads to a position that does not support oocyte cryopreservation 
by healthy women. Second, healthy women who might benefit from oocyte 
cryopreservation have been portrayed as victims of a male-oriented society that makes it 
difficult for women to combine motherhood with a good education or professional 
responsibilities. Third, healthy women opting to cryopreserve oocytes have been 
portrayed as wise, proactive women who will not have to depend on oocyte donors should 
they suffer from age-related infertility by the time they are ready to reproduce. As these 
portrayals are quite prominent in the lay media and shape public opinion, it is important 
to have an insight in the extent to which they are truthful and in what their shortcomings 
are.  
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1.2 Selfish, career-pursuing women 
When the phenomenon of egg freezing for so-called ‘social reasons’ first hit the headlines, 
the portrayal of the women who might request this new technology was largely 
judgmental and negative:  
The popular media conjured up visions of selfish, self-absorbed career women 
deliberately avoiding motherhood in their 20s and 30s whilst relying on cryobiology 
to produce their own genetic babies for them in their 40s and 50s. (Lockwood, 2003; 
p.152) 
 
Social egg freezing generally arises because a woman chooses to delay bearing 
children. This could be because they wish to further their career before parenthood. 
(Catt, 2009)  
 
[Professor Ledger] believes that it is ethically questionable for women to freeze 
their eggs purely for 'lifestyle reasons'. (Fletcher, 2009) 
In contrast with women who are faced with the prospect of infertility due to cancer 
treatment, these women were seen as facing infertility due to their own ‘life style choices’ 
and thus due to their own fault. In this case the reasoning goes that women who postpone 
motherhood to pursue a career until the point where they suffer from age-related fertility 
decline, are themselves accountable for this misfortune as they misplaced their priorities. 
Available data (although limited) on the profile of women requesting AGE banking show 
that most of these women are indeed highly educated, which appears to support the first 
narrative (Nekkebroeck et al, 2010; Hodes-Wertz et al, 2013; Baldwin et al, 2015; Cobo et 
al, 2016). However, most of these women do not request egg freezing at a young age with 
the intent of putting motherhood on hold in order to pursue their careers. Rather, the 
large majority of women consider the procedure to be a back-up plan in case natural 
reproduction fails (Hodes-Wertz et al, 2013). Oftentimes, they present themselves when 
they are approaching their forties and are faced with the fact that although they want to 
be parents, they have not found the right partner yet (which, granted, may be due in part 
to investing a lot of time in their education and careers) (Cobo et al, 2016). Thus, these 
women did not necessarily choose to delay parenthood, but their personal situation did 
not allow them to have children earlier in life. For these women, oocyte cryopreservation 
is a way of clinging onto the last straw of hope they have for ever establishing a family at 
a moment when their ovarian reserve has already diminished substantially. 
The question then is: was it wrong for these women to invest in their education and career 
at the expense of their fertility? Would it be better if women paid more attention to 
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childbearing than to career building at the time when they are most fertile (between the 
ages of 20 and 30)? Several studies have found that women find it increasingly important 
to first complete their education, have financial security, good housing and a stable 
relationship before taking on the responsibility of parenthood (Lampic et al., 2006; 
Maheshwari et al., 2008; Tough et al, 2007). These are not selfish concerns, but 
considerations that are made in the best interest of their future children. Bonneux et al. 
(2008) have argued that the rising age of women at first childbirth is a trend that increases 
overall wellbeing and that should not be regretted in itself, even if it is regrettable that 
the peak of natural female fertility does not coincide with this age period. They even go 
as far as to say that having children before the age of 23 is not to be encouraged, given 
the heightened risk of social deprivation. This means that the ‘perfect’ time for 
reproducing – not too early for reasons of wellbeing, not too late for medical reasons – is 
between the ages of 25 and 35. As previously argued by Lockwood (2011, p. 338), “[b]oth 
women and men, especially if they have received a tertiary-level education and have good 
employment prospects, are simply unprepared to cope with the consequences of the very 
narrow window of opportunity for parenthood that exists in the decade between 
realization of educational, career and economic goals and the onset of, at best, a reduced 
family size compared with their ideal and, at worst, involuntary childlessness.”   
This brings us to the second narrative: if it is in fact not the educated women’s fault that 
they cannot reproduce at the optimal age, can we then put the blame on society? 
1.3 Victims of a male-oriented society 
The premise of this second narrative is that society, and most notably the way the labor 
market is structured, makes it difficult for women to combine motherhood with a good 
education or professional responsibilities. The labor market is seen as leaving little room 
for family responsibilities, which was workable years ago with an all-male labor force and 
women as primary caregivers, but is not adapted to today’s typical family with two 
working partners.  
This second narrative can be invoked to support oocyte cryopreservation by healthy 
women as an intervention that women are entitled to, given the expectations of today’s 
society: 
It seems unfair that society at large, which creates the economic, educational, and 
professional conditions that encourages deferred maternity, discourages women 
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from using technology to bypass a biological inequity—the early loss of fecundity. 
(Gosden et al, 2000)  
 
[W]omen face reductions in earning capacity and potentially serious financial 
implications that men do not. In fact, they may have very few choices at all. 
(Savulescu & Goold, 2008)  
 
[W]e are disturbed by the implied judgment that our society, having failed to 
sufficiently safeguard the ability of many women in their twenties and thirties to 
establish families without jeopardizing career advancement, cannot withstand the 
challenges posed by elective deferral of childbearing. (Rybak & Lieman, 2009).  
Alternatively, the idea that society forces women to postpone parenthood can be invoked 
to oppose oocyte cryopreservation. In this case, it is argued that although accepting 
oocyte cryopreservation as a ‘quick fix’ for social inequalities can heal the problem of age-
onset infertility, it does not tackle the root of the problem, which ought to be remedied 
by taking measures that make it easier for women to have their children earlier in life:  
[O]ne might ask whether we actually help women […] by taking for granted their 
bad employment situation and offering them egg freezing to deal with it. (Goold & 
Savulescu, 2008; p. 50)  
 
[T]echnological solutions to social problems may result in a greater degree of 
repression rather than liberation […] Would it not be likely […] that women, who 
already feel that they are expected by employers to postpone (or give up) 
motherhood, would now be expected to freeze their eggs if they pursue a career? 
[…] the best way to overcome society’s restrictive influence on the individual’s 
ability to act autonomously is to change the societal norms that give rise to this 
oppression, rather than encouraging individuals […] to adapt to these norms. 
(Shkedi-Rafid and Hashiloni-Dolev, 2012; p. 156-157)  
 
The reproductive technology of egg freezing […] cannot escape the serious feminist 
worry about potentially reinforcing patriarchy and leaving the problematic social 
structures largely intact. (Petropanagos, 2010; p. 233)  
 
[E]gg freezing may leave the hard work of moving society toward greater sexual 
equality untouched […] technological solutions to social problems are inadequate 
and often result in the further oppression of disadvantaged groups. (Harwood, 2009; 
p.46)  
Fertility preservation for social reasons is then a type of unnecessary medicalization of 
society that can be avoided by creating a better social climate for working mothers. In a 
study by Hodes-Wertz et al (surveying AGE bankers from a clinic in New York), nineteen 
percent of women opting for AGE banking indicate that workplace inflexibility 
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contributed to a delay in their parental project (Hodes-Wertz et al, 2013). This indicates 
that much work remains to be done in order to achieve a better balance between 
professional and private responsibilities. However, it also indicates that such efforts 
would not make the demand for AGE banking disappear. Moreover, symptoms and root 
causes are best treated simultaneously in order to obtain the fastest results. Dondorp and 
de Wert (2009) have pointed out that women “cannot afford to wait until society has been 
changed in a way that would allow them to have it all at the right time” (p. 1781). Few 
people would argue that the individual medical treatment of obesity should be halted 
because the distribution of obesity over socioeconomic classes shows that social 
inequality or poverty is the underlying problem. Medical treatment and societal change 
are not mutually exclusive and thus there is no reason to abandon one to pursue the 
other.  
Also, whether societal change will have any impact on the age of first-time mothers, and 
if such an impact is even desirable to start with, is debatable. In this context it is both 
amusing and remarkable that a 1969 study from Maxwell and Montgomery found that at 
that time, there was societal pressure towards early parenthood “although this is opposed 
to the desire of young couples for delayed parenthood” (Maxwell & Montgomery, 1969, p. 
340). This presents us with the question: has this situation reversed itself in the last 50 
years and is there currently societal pressure to delay parenthood – a claim that is 
supported by young mothers who report that “society [sees] them as “bad mothers” 
simply because they [are] young” (Benzies et al., 2006, p. 629) – while women would prefer 
to have children at a younger age? Or have women’s preferences stayed the same while 
they are now finally liberated of the societal pressure to reproduce as young as possible? 
A study by Tough et al. (2007) in a Canadian population shows that most consider the ideal 
age to begin parenting to be somewhere between the ages of 25 and 35. This is in line with 
the previously mentioned findings that women prefer to complete their education, have 
financial security, good housing and a stable relationship before starting a family. Thus, 
it is very unlikely that socio-economical measures to stimulate having children before 
these goals have been met will have a great impact, nor that such measures are desirable. 
Hakim (2003) makes the same prediction that family-friendly adaptations to employment 
policies – although welcomed by parents (male and female) seeking to better combine 
parental and professional obligations – will not automatically lead to more children 
and/or younger parents. She bases herself on a preference theory with the underlying 
idea that such measures would benefit people who are ‘home-centered’ to start with 
(mainly women), which is the same group that would be willing to cut back on their career 
to have children anyhow. At the same time, such measures are unlikely to affect people 
who are ‘work-centered’. This theory is also confirmed by data from Van Balen (2005), 
indicating that a strong desire to have children overrides motivations to postpone 
motherhood.  
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Another way to look at the trend to delay parenthood is to consider it in regard to an 
increased acceptance of voluntarily childless couples and an increased awareness that a 
life without children is not inferior in terms of overall wellbeing to a life with children 
and may indeed be more rewarding. Childfree couples remain a minority but their 
numbers have been growing steadily and are already estimated to be higher than 
involuntarily childless couples (Agrillo & Nelini, 2008). Delaying parenthood can then be 
seen as a conscious decision aimed at enjoying the best of both worlds (first without and 
then with children), rather than being some kind of second-best option. In other words, 
it is too simple to claim that women are forced by a male-oriented society to delay 
childbearing and that changing employment policies to render them more women-
friendly is all it takes to lower the age of first-time mothers. Rather, many women prefer 
to delay motherhood and have good reasons to do so, even in a world where having 
children would not have an impact on career opportunities. 
1.4 Wise, proactive women 
This brings us to the starting point of the last narrative: neither women, nor society at 
large (nor men for that matter) should be scolded for a shift in the age of primigravid 
women. Societal and personal factors make it a smart choice for women and men to delay 
parenthood, despite the risk of remaining childless all together. Also, an abundance of 
dating websites cannot guarantee that every woman will meet her ‘mister right’ in her 
early twenties, nor that he will agree to have children at that age. So does a woman in her 
early thirties who wants to have children but not in her current condition have other 
options besides storing her oocytes until the circumstances are better? Sure, she does: 
she can either wait it out and risk remaining childless or having to rely on donor oocytes, 
or she can rush into having children without having a stable relationship or a stable 
financial situation. However, these are not necessarily better options, neither for her nor 
her future offspring, than to store her oocytes (even with a limited chance of success). 
Reproducing as fast as possible can be a great strategy from a gynecological point of view, 
but it may be a very bad choice from many other points of view.  
The third narrative therefore takes the fact that many women attempt to reproduce in 
their late thirties – after their most fertile period – as a given, rather than as a variable 
that ought to change. According to this third narrative, the right way to present ‘elective 
egg freezing’ is not to see it as an alternative to reproducing earlier in life – as this is often 
simply not an option or not a good one – but as a back-up plan in case natural 
reproduction fails and as an alternative to relying on donor oocytes. It can be seen as a 
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form of self-donation whereby the younger version of a woman donates eggs to her older 
version so that she is able to reproduce at an older age while keeping the genetic link 
between parent and child and while using younger oocytes with less risks of 
complications (Rybak & Lieman, 2009; Knopman et al, 2010; Hodes-Wertz et al, 2013). 
Rather than representing unnecessary medicalization of reproduction, elective egg 
freezing then becomes a form of preventive medicine (Stoop, 2010; Lockwood, 2011): 
Many women end up childless as a result of postponing childbearing. Some want to 
plan ahead and try to prevent this outcome. As long as these women are fully 
informed and able to make rational decisions about their fertility, we should allow 
them to make their own financial decisions. (Goold & Savulescu, 2009; p. 57) 
 
[W]hat if some women do want to freeze their eggs at 30, to ‘use’ at 45 and achieve 
what is genetically their own baby? Is that decision somehow less moral than using 
IVF at 45 with a 5% chance of a pregnancy and a 70% chance of a miscarriage, or 
using the precious, scarce resource of donor eggs and settling for ‘someone else’s’ 
baby as preferable to no baby at all? (Lockwood, 2003, p. 153) 
While this third narrative is all too easily embraced by commercial enterprises that offer 
egg freezing services, it is unfortunately not unproblematic. If women would deliberately 
delay childbearing until their forties, they could proactively freeze their eggs around 
their 30th birthday and achieve good success rates. However, this is not how things 
usually go in practice. As discussed earlier, women usually do not plan to have their 
children in their late thirties or forties, but they postpone childbearing bit by bit by lack 
of a partner, a demanding job, financial insecurity, etc. (a phenomenon also known as 
‘perpetual postponing’) and before they know it their reproductive years have passed 
(Lockwood, 2011). Women are not inclined to undergo the demanding and costly 
procedure of ovarian stimulation and oocyte retrieval at the peak of their fertility. At that 
moment they are either not yet thinking about starting a family or they expect to find a 
partner in due time. Several studies have indicated that women underestimate the speed 
at which female fertility declines and that the possibilities of overturning age-related 
infertility through IVF are highly overestimated (Hammarberg & Clarke, 2005; Lampic et 
al., 2006; Maheshwari et al., 2008; Bretherick et al., 2010). Moreover, cryopreserving 
oocytes requires a substantial financial investment that women are only willing to make 
when there is a substantial possibility that they will ever ‘cash in’ on this investment. It 
is only when their time is running out, when approaching the symbolic age of forty, that 
most women start to worry about remaining childless and resort to oocyte 
cryopreservation. The oocytes that are preserved at that point already have a decreased 
potential to result in a successful pregnancy. Moreover, when lack of a partner is the 
problem, this problem may persist so that frozen oocytes remain unused. Thus, although 
egg freezing is potentially a wise and proactive measure for women in today’s society, in 
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practice it is often a desperate measure with a low utility (Mertes and Pennings, 2011, see 
chapter 3).  
However, this last narrative can serve as an ideal to be pursued. One can only hope that 
through public education on declining fertility with age, a reduction in costs and 
awareness about the possibility to store oocytes at a young age, the women 
cryopreserving their oocytes will one day resemble the ideal of smart, proactive women 
rather than the image of desperate singles… 
1.5 Conclusion 
The ethical debate regarding oocyte cryopreservation for healthy women has often been 
reduced to putting the women on trial who might benefit from it. Who are these women 
who want to defy nature and do they deserve this new expansion of their reproductive 
liberty? Three different narratives can be discerned: women interested in elective egg 
freezing are either portrayed as selfishly prioritizing their career over motherhood, as 
being forced by society to postpone motherhood or as smart, proactive women who have 
discovered a new means to make their career compatible with motherhood. The first 
narrative is probably the furthest away from reality, as the age at which healthy women 
currently request oocyte cryopreservation indicates that ‘postponement’ of childbearing 
is seldom planned at a young age and thus that freezing oocytes is rather an emergency 
intervention than part of a well designed life plan to ‘have it all’. However, it is argued 
here that also the other two narratives are misrepresentations to a certain extent. Just as 
it is inaccurate to state that women choose to delay childbearing in order to advance their 
careers, it is also inaccurate to say that they have no other option but to delay 
childbearing. When people have their children depends on an interplay between 
contextual factors and personal values and neither one will completely override the 
other. Finally, the image of smart, proactive women is rather an idealistic picture of who 
the best candidates would be than an accurate depiction of those who actually come 
forward. 
In conclusion, it may be interesting to learn who the candidates for elective oocyte 
cryopreservation are, what their motives are and how they got into a situation in which 
they need to or want to delay childbearing until after their reproductive years. However, 
a judgmental approach will not offer a clear answer to the question whether elective egg 
freezing is good or bad medical practice. The central question should not be whether or 
not women are deserving of oocyte cryopreservation, but whether or not oocyte 
cryopreservation for this particular indication does more good than harm. This 
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evaluation will depend a lot on the utility rate, that is, on the number of women who 
actually return to use their frozen oocytes and on the success rates for these women. As 
argued elsewhere (Mertes and Pennings, 2011, see chapter 3), if the only candidates for 
AGE banking are women whose ovarian reserve is already at a critical threshold, then the 
utility of this procedure will be very low and women will be buying false hope at a high 
price. However, if women become more aware of the effect of aging on their fertility, of 
the possibility to store oocytes in their fertile years (preferably before age 35) and of the 
limits of the procedure (especially when they are already over the age of 35), oocyte 
cryopreservation may be a welcome intervention for women who long to preserve their 
fertility longer than they naturally could.  
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Chapter 2  
Arguments for and against 
Abstract:  
In this chapter, the different arguments pro and con oocyte cryopreservation to 
counter age-related fertility decline will be presented and critically assessed. The 
arguments that we should not try to circumvent natural boundaries, solve societal 
problems with medical solutions or that AGE banking will have a negative impact 
on society are found wanting or only partially convincing. On the other side of the 
debate, the argument that we should allow AGE banking to combat gender 
inequality in terms of the maximal age at childbirth is dismissed, but the argument 
that women’s reproductive autonomy should be respected, that this technology 
may not only clinically, but also psychologically benefit patients and that it is 
inconsistent to support egg donation by others, but not autologous egg donation 
appear to carry some weight. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on:  
Mertes H. Ethical aspects of AGE banking. In D. Stoop (ed.) The prevention of age related 
fertility loss. Springer, forthcoming. 
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2.1 Introduction 
In this second chapter, the focus is shifted from the portrayals of the women who (might) 
request oocyte cryopreservation (OC) in response to age-related fertility decline – or 
anticipated gamete exhaustion (AGE) – to the procedure itself. First, arguments will be 
presented that lead to a fundamental objection against, or a fundamental support for ‘AGE 
banking’. The main arguments against AGE banking are that it is unnatural, that is 
amounts to unwarranted medicalization and that it has a negative impact on society. The 
main arguments for AGE banking are that it leads to more gender equality and 
reproductive autonomy, that it generates psychological benefits and diminishes the need 
for third party reproduction. In chapter 3, these fundamental objections will be 
complemented with concerns about the practical implementation strategies that may be 
followed. 
2.2 Fundamental objections against AGE banking 
2.2.1 The argument from nature 
A first set of fundamental objections against AGE-banking relate to the idea that this 
technology pushes the boundaries of nature. The age at which the average woman 
becomes infertile is then not merely labelled as a biological fact, as the age at which 
women can no longer have children, but rather as the age at which women should no 
longer have children. In ethical theory, this phenomenon is known as the is-ought fallacy. 
Unless if one starts from the religious belief that everything was created for a clear 
purpose and that we live in the best of all possible worlds, the (average) natural state of 
things does not teach us anything about how things ought to be. This also implies that 
there is no obvious reason why medical interventions should be limited to preserving or 
restoring the natural state of things – as is done in ‘medical’ egg freezing – and should not 
be used to counter natural phenomena that have a negative impact on our wellbeing. It 
should be remarked that many illnesses are age-related, just as the decline in female 
fertility, and that many medical interventions are performed to solve inconveniences 
that may be considered ‘normal’ if they occur at a certain age. In fact, not much of modern 
day medicine would remain, if we were to cancel all interventions for age-related health 
problems. Yet, nobody seems to be opposed to the treatment of Alzheimer’s disease or 
osteoporosis. The distinction between medical and non-medical egg freezing based on the 
idea that aging is not a medical problem is therefore problematic. If we have good reasons 
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to counteract infertility for women with a desire for parenthood, then it matters little 
what the cause of the pending infertility is.  
Also, besides the fact that the distinction between medical and non-medical OC is 
irrelevant, it is also a false distinction in the sense that there is a grey area in between 
these two applications (Stoop et al, 2014). For instance, should women who request OC 
due to a prognosis of unexplained premature ovarian insufficiency be regarded as 
freezing for medical or non-medical reasons? Even for cancer patients, certain regimens 
of radiation or chemotherapy will lead to immediate sterility in (reproductively speaking) 
older women, but not in younger women. If the former decide to store their oocytes, this 
decision will be both disease-related and age-related.  
 
2.2.2 Medicalization 
A related objection against AGE-banking is that it provides a medical solution for a 
problem that in essence is not a medical problem, but a societal one, namely the steady 
rise in women’s age at first childbirth, now on average between 25 and 35 years old 
(Lemoine & Ravitsky, 2014). This can then be attributed either to the woman herself or to 
the way the labour market is structured, as was discussed in the previous chapter. 
If women are held accountable for ‘delaying’ childbearing due to ‘lifestyle choices’, the 
non-medical alternative to OC is obvious and simple: women should reproduce earlier. 
This reasoning was reflected in the ASRM’s statement from 2007, which implied that 
women who want to bank eggs for age-related fertility decline “have other options”, 
whereas, for example, cancer patients do not (ASRM, 2007). This is however easier said 
than done as the most important reason for banking eggs in healthy women is the lack of 
a partner (Nekkebroeck et al, 2010; Hodes-Wertz et al., 2013; Baldwin et al, 2015; Stoop et 
al, 2015; De Groot et al, 2016). Should we thus encourage women to become single 
mothers? Should we advise them not to wait for Mr. Right, but go for Mr. Good Enough? 
As mentioned earlier, the desire to postpone parenthood until a secure and stable 
personal situation is established cannot be easily pushed aside.  
Alternatively, rather than holding women accountable for the rising age at first 
childbirth, society might be blamed, in the sense that many women experience 
difficulties in starting a parental project during their reproductive lifespan due to 
professional obligations. While fertility preservation can offer a solution to this problem 
once it presents itself, it does not tackle the root cause. Fertility preservation for social 
reasons is then a type of unnecessary medicalization of society that can be avoided by 
creating a better social climate for working mothers. However, societal change takes 
time. While we might attempt to tackle the (hypothetical) root cause of delayed 
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childbearing by making it easier for young parents (both women and men) to combine 
personal and professional responsibilities, this is unfortunately not a solution for women 
who are in their late thirties and involuntarily childless today. Therefore, long term 
solutions to the benefit of future generations should not prevent us from offering 
practical solutions to the present generation (Dondorp & de Wert, 2009; see chapter 1). 
Moreover, keeping in mind that lack of a partner is the primary reason to request AGE 
banking, we should be sceptical that reforms in the labour market will reduce the demand 
for AGE banking. At the same time, we should remain vigilant that the option of AGE 
banking is not invoked as an excuse to invest less in reforms in the labour marked that 
enable a better combination of professional and parental obligations. 
2.2.3 A negative impact on society 
Related to the argument that women’s employment situation does not allow them to 
reproduce at a young age, there is a concern that the offer of AGE banking will increase 
the pressure on women to invest in their careers while they are young at the expense of 
pursuing parenthood. This concern became especially convincing when Facebook and 
Apple announced that they would start offering OC to their female employees. As will be 
argued in chapter 5, even if AGE banking in itself may not be ethically problematic, the 
offer by employers is. For such a policy to be implemented with respect for women’s 
reproductive autonomy, a substantial number of conditions need to be fulfilled, which 
can be reduced to three categories: (1) women should understand the benefits, risks and 
limitations, (2) women should feel no pressure to take up the offer; (3) the offer should 
have no negative effect on other family-friendly policies and should in fact be 
accompanied by such policies. Fulfilling these conditions may turn out to be impossible. 
Thus, regardless of companies’ possible good intentions, women’s reproductive 
autonomy is not well served by offering them company-sponsored AGE banking (this 
claim will be further elaborated on in chapter 5). 
Another concern is that the offer of AGE-banking may cause an increase in the average 
age at which women become mothers. Although this effect is possible, there are various 
reasons why it is unlikely that this effect would be significant. First, the number of women 
opting to bank oocytes is likely to remain a small fraction of all women desiring to become 
mothers, as the procedure requires a substantial physical and financial effort. Second, it 
is wrong to assume that these women make a choice between reproducing ‘now’ or 
reproducing a couple of years later. For many of the women opting for AGE banking, 
reproducing at the moment of freezing is not an option (due to lack of a partner, as 
mentioned). The more likely alternatives are thus either not reproducing at all, or 
reproducing via donor oocytes at the same age as they would reproduce with their own, 
cryopreserved oocytes. Third, the overwhelming majority of women who bank oocytes 
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do so in their late thirties and on average consider the maximum age to use the oocytes 
below 44 years (Stoop et al, 2015). This means that even for the small fraction of women 
who would consider a pregnancy at the time of freezing if AGE banking were not available 
(for example as a single mother through donor conception in countries where this is 
available for single women), motherhood is only ‘postponed’ for about 5 years. 
Preliminary results from egg banking programs reported on by Cobo et al, even suggest a 
shorter average time between the time eggs are banked and women return to use them 
(Cobo et al, 2016). In conclusion, the most likely effect of offering fertility preservation to 
healthy women is not a decline in the number of young mothers but a small incline in the 
number of older mothers.  Whether this is a positive or negative evolution is debatable. 
Studies focusing on the physical risks associated with pregnancy and childbirth after 40 
– which are elevated but not necessarily problematic – would consider this a negative 
evolution. As previously pointed out by several authors, however, this is a very one-
dimensional perspective, as there are also substantial benefits to late parenthood, for 
example psychologically and economically (Bernstein and Wiesemann, 2014; Ekberg, 
2014). Therefore, even if AGE banking would result in a slight increase in the average age 
at first childbirth, this is not necessarily a negative evolution. 
2.3 Fundamental arguments for AGE banking 
2.3.1 Gender equality 
An argument in favour of AGE banking is that this intervention is emancipatory in nature 
as it can fix the factual discrimination between men and women in regard to their 
reproductive lifespan: if men are able to conceive children at an advanced age, then 
women should have the same liberty. This is again an example of the is-ought-fallacy. The 
mere biological fact that a 70-year old man is capable of conceiving children, says nothing 
about the morality of doing so. However, as reproductive freedom is highly valued in our 
society, we do not impose forced sterilization on men above a certain age. Reproduction 
at an advanced age is thus a liberty right, but that does not mean that it is also a claim 
right. That means that if an infertile senior citizen (male or female) applies for IVF 
treatment, it may not be granted based on considerations regarding the welfare of the 
future child. Given the fact that pregnancy complications are an additional concern in the 
case of women, a lower cut-off age in ART for women than for men may be justified.  
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2.3.2 Reproductive autonomy 
The main argument for AGE banking is that it increases reproductive autonomy. This 
claim is not uncontroversial. As mentioned above and as will be discussed in chapters 3 
and 5, depending on how egg banking is marketed and offered to women, it can either 
reinforce reproductive liberty or put it under pressure. This is not typical for egg banking, 
but for many innovations and practices in reproductive medicine (e.g. surrogacy or egg 
donation). In this context Widdows has argued that “[f]eminists should deny the 
prevailing assumption that to prevent exploitation, all that is necessary is to ensure that 
the woman gives her fully informed consent to whatever act is in question. This 
assumption rests on the philosophical and political premise that if the individual freely 
consents – to seemingly any act – then it is not possible to consider her exploited. But it 
is, and she is” (Widdows, 2009, p. 21). On the other side of the debate, Robertson has 
argued that “there is no reason to think that women do not end up with more rather than 
less reproductive freedom as a result of technological innovation. If so, procreative 
liberty is an important bulwark that helps women achieve the greater freedom that 
reproductive advances make possible. […] Although procreative liberty gives little 
protection from family or internal pressures to procreate or from lack of resources, it 
does prevent arbitrary, moralistic, or speculative governmental impositions on a 
woman’s procreative choice”, adding also that social policy does need to protect women 
from private sector coercion, which will also be discussed in chapters 3 and 5 (Robertson, 
1994, p. 231).  
Thus, starting from the premise that due care is taken in the provision of egg banking, 
going beyond merely requiring informed consent, we can say that due to this new 
technology, women are theoretically able to extend their reproductive lifespan and are 
thus less dependent on donor oocytes if they wish to reproduce at an age at which their 
ovarian reserves are depleted (see below). As mentioned above, the age at which women 
desire to have children rises and not all women succeed in finding a partner with whom 
to share parenthood before the decline of their fertility. When single, childless women 
reach their late thirties and still want to become mothers, they – unlike men – are under 
pressure to find a partner fast and embark on parenthood with that new partner fast, or 
resort to single parenthood. AGE banking can relieve women of this pressure by offering 
them a couple more years to find a suitable partner, thus allowing for more autonomous 
choices (De Groot et al, 2016). Research by Hodes-Wertz et al. (2013) and by Stoop et al 
(2015) shows that a large majority of women opting for AGE banking feels empowered by 
the procedure. This is also confirmed by anecdotal reports, such as those by Richards 
(2015). Caveats are that only a limited number of oocytes can be banked, so that a 
pregnancy – let alone a live birth – can certainly not be guaranteed and that women still 
face legal restrictions on the age until which they can use their banked oocytes to (try to) 
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establish a pregnancy. As Robertson noted in this regard, “$50,000 for egg freezing at 37 
is an expensive and probably ineffective way to quiet the ticking fertility clock. If a 
woman is listening carefully, this move will only lessen the thrum, not quiet it altogether” 
(Robertson, 2014, p 122). Also, as will be discussed in chapter 5, if women experience 
pressure to bank their oocytes (for example as a way of showing that they take their 
carreers seriously), their reproductive autonomy will be limited, rather than increased.  
Absolute prerequisites for AGE banking to positively influence reproductive autonomy 
are therefore that absence of outside pressure and the procurement of correct 
information about the possibilities and limitations. The overly optimistic portrayal of AGE 
banking as ‘insurance against infertility’ or as a means to defer childbearing while 
retaining fertility misguides women about the limitations. If a woman with a very strong 
desire for parenthood would defer childbearing relying on banked oocytes and 
subsequently fails to achieve a pregnancy with those banked oocytes, her reproductive 
autonomy was very ill-served by AGE banking. 
2.3.3 Psychological benefit 
Linked to reproductive autonomy and the pressure on finding a suitable partner when a 
woman approaches the end of her reproductive lifespan is the observation that women 
may not only derive a clinical benefit (the chance of conceiving a child), but also a 
psychological benefit from knowing that there is still ‘a chance’ for her to have children, 
regardless of whether she ever actually uses her stored eggs. Research by Stoop et al 
(2015) shows that even women who have banked oocytes but have never used them or no 
longer envisage using them do not regret their decision to bank and would do so again in 
similar circumstances. Also, some women decide a couple of years after banking that they 
will embark on single parenthood although their preferential life plan involved building 
a family with a partner. Banking then allowed them some extra time to consider the 
option of single parenthood without Damocles’ sword hanging above their heads. Also, 
even if women eventually remain childless, the fact that they banked their eggs gives 
them the impression that they ‘tried everything they could’ (De Groot et al, 2016). This is 
an important elemement in coping with involuntary childlessness, as was previously 
described by Daniluk (2001). 
2.3.4 Self-donation 
A strong argument for allowing AGE banking is that it is in fact a form of oocyte donation 
which does not involve a third party (Knopman et al., 2010; Rybak and Lieman, 2009). If a 
woman is currently unable to conceive due to a depletion of her ovarian reserve, she can 
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establish a pregnancy with donor oocytes, but there are some drawbacks to this option. 
First, the resulting child will not have a genetic connection with the mother. Although 
this is not necessarily problematic, it is a suboptimal option for many people, either 
because they identify parenthood with genetic parenthood (or at least presuppose that 
one is ‘more’ of a parent when there is a genetic connection) or because they fear a 
disruption of their family unit if the donor would claim a role or if the child would regard 
the donor as the ‘real’ mother (Wyverkens et al, 2015). Second, oocyte donation requires 
that a healthy woman is subjected to ovarian stimulation and oocyte retrieval. These are 
unpleasant and time-consuming procedures with (limited) risks involved, which hold no 
benefit for the woman who is subjected to these risks. Both donor anonymity and open 
identity donation are potentially problematic for the donor, in the former case because 
she might want to know the person resulting from her donation, in the latter case because 
she might not want to be contacted by that person. As we currently allow donor 
conception despite these drawbacks, it would be inconsistent not to allow a woman to 
donate oocytes to her future self. In this case the genetic link is maintained and the person 
subjected to the risks of ovarian stimulation is the same person as the one who reaps the 
benefit of (potential) parenthood. The only dissimilarity that might be invoked to justify 
a different approach is that in the case of ‘regular’ oocyte donation, the need for a donor 
oocyte is present, whereas when a woman decides to bank oocytes for future use, she can 
never be certain that there will ever be an actual need. Therefore, the effort might be in 
vain. 
2.4 Conclusion 
Despite the original opposition against AGE banking for healthy women, AGE banking has 
found its way to the clinic rather fast. One reason for this evolution may be that a number 
of the initial ethical objections to oocyte freezing for so-called ‘social’ or ‘non-medical’ 
reasons were not very convincing, especially given the contrast with the warm welcome 
oocyte banking received in the field of oncofertility. The arguments that we should not 
try to circumvent natural boundaries, solve societal problems with medical solutions or 
that AGE banking will have a negative impact on society are either flawed or only partially 
convincing. On the other side of the debate, the argument that we should allow AGE 
banking to combat gender inequality in terms of the maximal age at childbirth was 
dismissed, but the argument that women’s reproductive autonomy should be respected, 
that this technology may not only clinically, but also psychologically benefit patients and 
that it is inconsistent to support egg donation by others, but not autologous egg donation 
appear to carry some weight. 
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However, even if there are good arguments to bring AGE banking to the clinic, a cautious 
approach is warranted. First of all, the utility of the procedure may be low and women 
may be overly optimistic about their chances of conceiving after AGE banking. They 
should therefore be properly counselled and sufficiently informed about their personal 
chances of success. Misleading information by commercial companies and coercive offers 
from companies to their female employees are to be avoided and finally, reflection is 
needed on access to the technology and on the extent in which reimbursement by public 
healthcare is desirable. These issues will be discussed in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 3  
AGE banking for better, not for worse 
Abstract:  
The possibility for healthy women to cryopreserve their oocytes in order to counter 
future infertility has gained momentum in recent years. However, women tend to 
cryopreserve oocytes at an age that is suboptimal from a clinical point of view - in 
their late thirties - when both oocyte quantity and quality have already 
considerably diminished and success rates for eventually establishing a pregnancy 
are thus limited. This also gives rise to ethical concerns, as the procedure is seen as 
giving false hope to (reproductively speaking) older women. We evaluate which 
measures can be taken to turn AGE banking into a procedure that is both clinically 
and ethically better than the current practice. The main objective of these measures 
is to convince those women who are most likely to (want to) reproduce at an above 
average age to cryopreserve their oocytes at a time when this intervention is still 
likely to lead to a life birth and to discourage fertility clinics from specifically 
targeting women who have already surpassed the age at which good results can be 
expected. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Published as:  
Mertes H, Pennings G. Social egg freezing: for better, not for worse. Reproductive 
BioMedicine Online 2011;23:824-829. (Reprinted in Fertility Magazine 2013;15:40-45.)  
  39 
3.1 Introduction 
Women and their reproductive choices are always a welcome subject for ethical concern. 
Whether voluntary prostitution, surrogacy or oocyte donation are concerned, one of the 
recurring questions is always this: should women be allowed to engage in practices that 
may cause them physical or psychological harm, or should these practices be prohibited 
in the name of women’s wellbeing and the moral high ground? The latest issue to feed 
the traditional standoff between respecting women’s autonomous decisions and 
(paternalistically) protecting them from exploitation is the possibility for healthy women 
to cryopreserve their oocytes, just in case they have no (good) oocytes left by the time 
they are ready to reproduce. While the option for cancer patients to freeze oocytes in the 
face of treatments that may render them infertile is met with enthusiasm, offering the 
same option to healthy women is met with a lot more suspicion and reluctance, both by 
practitioners and policy-makers (ASRM, 2007; Jones, 2009; Martin, 2010; McCullough, 
2004; Shkedi-Rafid and Hashiloni-Dolev, 2011). First, there are a number of ‘fundamental’ 
objections, as discussed in chapter 2. 
Second, there are a number of more emotionally charged objections. Not only is the yuck-
factor at play but there is also an ambiguous depiction of women who seek to store their 
oocytes for ‘non-medical reasons’. As was discussed in chapter 1, opponents of AGE 
banking oftentimes depict these womeneither as selfish career women (and thus 
undeserving of help) or as victims of a male-oriented society that neglects young mothers 
and of an unscrupulous fertility industry that is ready to cash in on their fear for 
infertility (and thus in need of protection). (Martin, 2010) But why should these women 
be either perpetrators or victims? Instead of casting a moral verdict, we start from the 
simple observation that more and more women postpone motherhood and we grant that 
those who consider to go through the burdensome procedure of cryopreserving oocytes, 
most likely have very good reasons for postponing motherhood.  
While the success rates of IVF with oocytes that have been subjected to slow freezing are 
significantly lower than those with fresh oocytes (Borini et al., 2010; Magli et al., 2010), 
cryopreservation with the vitrification technique offers success rates similar to those 
with fresh oocytes (Almodin et al., 2010; Grifo and Noyes, 2010; Kim et al., 2010; Rienzi et 
al., 2010; Trokoudes et al., 2011; Potdar et al 2014; Rienzi et al, 2017; Crawford et al, 2017). 
However, just as for fresh oocytes, the outcomes of IVF with vitrified oocytes are – 
unsurprisingly – highly dependent on maternal age at the time of freezing (Rienzi et al, 
2010). According to the data of the ASRM of all the SART member clinics for 2009, for 
women younger than 35, 41,4% of regular (fresh embryo) IVF cycles result in a live birth, 
women aged between 35 and 37 can expect a live birth rate per cycle of 31,7%, women 
aged between 38 and 40 a rate of 22,3% and women aged 41-42 a rate of 12,6% (ASRM Office 
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of Public Affairs, 2010). If only 40-year old women resort to egg freezing in a desperate 
attempt to ‘save’ their fertility, it will hardly produce any positive results and we believe 
that it is this image that has sparked the narrative of social egg freezers as women 
vulnerable to exploitation (Martin, 2010). However, by banning AGE banking, women who 
would stand to benefit from it and would not be exploited but helped by having a number 
of eggs in storage, will also lose out. If long term follow-up shows that vitrification is safe 
for the offspring and if correct information is supplied to candidate-freezers about the 
decline in their fertility, about pregnancy complications related to maternal age and 
about their individual chances of conceiving with their frozen eggs, a large part of the 
women who decide to cryopreserve their oocytes might actually be making a very 
rational and justified choice.  
The biggest challenge, however, is to assure that the procedure is used by those women 
who are most likely to benefit from it, namely women whose oocytes have not already 
considerably aged. In order to reach this goal, a double approach is needed. First, women 
need to be informed that they should store their oocytes before age 35 and second, the 
centres that offer elective oocyte cryopreservation should refrain from specifically 
targeting those women who are most desperate, namely those approaching their forties. 
In this way, AGE banking is used for better, but not for worse. 
3.2 The divergence between the best case scenario and the 
worst case scenario 
The best case scenario of elective freezing is the following. A woman in her late twenties 
or early thirties realizes that, although she has a strong desire to become a mother, she is 
unlikely to be in a good position to have children in the coming years (for example 
because she is single). She knows that by the time she will be ready to reproduce, her 
oocytes will have aged considerably (leading to low implantation rates and a higher risk 
of chromosomal abnormalities) or her ovarian reserve will be completely depleted so that 
she will remain childless or will have to use donor oocytes. This woman therefore 
proactively turns to an alternative option, namely to cryopreserve the young oocytes she 
has today, and use them to establish a pregnancy at a later point in her life.  
Since 2012, the ASRM no longer considers oocyte vitrification to be an experimental 
procedure (ASRM, 2012). Currently available data are very encouraging, both concerning 
the health of the resulting offspring, (especially for vitrification) concerning oocyte 
survival after freezing and thawing and concerning the subsequent success rates which 
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are comparable to those of fresh oocytes (Almodin et al., 2010; Grifo and Noyes, 2010; Kim 
et al., 2010; Rienzi et al., 2010; Trokoudes et al., 2011; Cobo et al, 2014; Potdar et al 2014; 
Rienzi et al, 2017; Crawford et al, 2017). Long term follow-up data on children born from 
vitrified oocytes are not yet available due to the novelty of the technique and thus the 
possibility remains  that oocyte freezing may affect the long term health of the offspring. 
However, while it is currently uncertain if such risks are involved in oocyte 
cryopreservation, they are certain to exist in aged oocytes. This means that even in this 
innovative phase, freezing eggs for future use can reasonably be expected to increase the 
overall health of future offspring for those women who have already decided to postpone 
motherhood. One might argue that relying on young donor oocytes is still safer, but this 
is not a valid alternative option for many women as donor oocytes are in short supply and 
worries exist about the physical and psychological welfare of donors. Moreover, without 
wanting to over-estimate the importance of a genetic link between parents and children 
or the psychological damage suffered by donor-conceived children, we believe it is fair to 
say that, when given the option, parents strongly prefer to have a genetic link with their 
children (Ravin et al., 1997). Oocyte cryopreservation can therefore – in principle – be 
applauded as another step in offering women more reproductive freedom. 
The worst case scenario, is that a woman only becomes aware of – or pays attention to – 
a decline in her fertility when she approaches or passes the symbolic age of 40 while 
lacking a stable relationship, then desperately seeks to hang on to whatever is left of her 
ovarian reserve and resorts to oocyte cryopreservation. In this scenario, a woman will 
either be irresponsive to ovarian stimulation all together or she will need multiple 
ovarian stimulation cycles to harvest a limited number of oocytes that are likely to give 
her a fairly small chance of conceiving when she is finally ready to reproduce. As Sage et 
al. (2008) have reported, “[t]he likelihood of retrieving an adequate number of mature 
oocytes decreases dramatically with age”. Moreover, the odds are considerable that a 
woman who is not ready to reproduce at 40 is no more ready a few years later and will 
thus never even return to use her frozen eggs. In this scenario, oocyte cryopreservation 
for healthy women appears to be a waste of medical resources and a source of 
unnecessary health risks. 
At present, women who opt for elective cryopreservation tend to lean more towards the 
worst case scenario than to the best case scenario, as the average reported age of women 
freezing their eggs is 37-38 (Gold et al., 2006; Klein et al., 2006; Sage et al., 2008; 
Nekkebroeck et al., 2010; Vallejo et al, 2013; Garcia-Velasco et al., 2013; Baldwin et al, 2015; 
Stoop et al, 2015; Cobo et al, 2016; De Groot et al, 2016). Moreover, the number of women 
who have so far actually frozen their oocytes might even represent the ‘best’ fraction of 
those who present themselves, as many women need to be turned down when 
preliminary tests indicate a diminished ovarian reserve. Of those women who do start the 
stimulation protocol, Klein et al. (2006) report a 24% cancellation rate due to suboptimal 
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response and of those cycles that they completed, only 58% yielded more than 10 oocytes, 
while standard stimulation was employed.  
There are several ways to deal with this situation: we can opt for a status quo, in which 
AGE banking will bring about more heartache than happiness, we can ‘pull the plug’ on 
AGE banking and label it ‘unethical’, whereby women will not be dragged into the worst 
case scenario, but only at the expense of those in the best case scenario or – preferably – 
we can try to promote oocyte cryopreservation for those women who are most likely to 
benefit from it and discourage or refuse those women who are the least likely to benefit 
from using the procedure. As female fertility starts to decline steeply from age 35 
onwards, the optimal timing for elective freezing would be between 30 and 35. Freezing 
at a younger age would be more favourable from a clinical point of view, but it would 
result in low usage rates, as the chances are considerable that these women will find a 
partner and reproduce naturally before their ovarian reserve is depleted. Freezing at an 
older age would significantly reduce the success rates (Cil et al, 2013; Cobo et al, 2016). 
Freezing above 43 years old is futile (with pregnancy rates per cycle of 2% and lower) and 
should not be offered at present (Hourvitz et al., 2009).  
3.3 Public awareness  
As mentioned, the average reported age of non-medical patients freezing their oocytes is 
37-38 years (Gold et al., 2006; Klein et al., 2006; Sage et al., 2008; Nekkebroeck et al., 2010; 
Vallejo et al, 2013; Garcia-Velasco et al, 2013; Baldwin et al, 2015; Stoop et al, 2015; Cobo 
et al, 2016; De Groot et al, 2016). However, both Gold et al and Stoop et al report that 
women indicate that if they had been aware of the possibility to freeze earlier, they would 
have done so earlier. Creating more public awareness is therefore a key factor in lowering 
the average age of social freezers. What exactly should women know in order to make an 
informed decision regarding elective oocyte cryopreservation? Merely informing them 
about the technical possibility to freeze eggs is not enough. Public awareness should be 
created on several fronts: 
 First, women need to be made aware that their fertility starts to decline long 
before the onset of menopause and that the age of 35 is a crucial turning point, 
rather than the age of 40.  
 Second, they need to know that this means that not only their chances of 
conceiving naturally, but also their chances of conceiving through IVF (with their 
own – aged – oocytes) plummet at that point. This is important, as several studies 
have indicated that women not only underestimate the speed at which female 
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fertility declines but also overestimate the possibilities of overturning age-related 
infertility through IVF (Bretherick et al., 2009; Lampic et al., 2006; Maheshwari et 
al., 2008).  
 Next, women should be informed that if they want children, but can foresee that 
they will not be ready to reproduce at 35, they can increase their chances of 
establishing a pregnancy and of having a healthy baby after that age if they 
cryopreserve their eggs at a younger age.  
 Finally, women above 35 need to understand that if they still want to cryopreserve 
oocytes, they are less likely to benefit from the procedure than their younger 
counterparts. Not only will the quality of their oocytes already have diminished, 
but they will also need to undergo more stimulation cycles to obtain the same 
number of oocytes. In other words: while they will need more oocytes, less will be 
harvested per stimulation cycle, rendering the whole procedure much more 
burdensome and less efficient. 
The most straightforward way to create public awareness is by launching awareness 
campaigns as is done for example to stimulate breast cancer screening or to reduce 
smoking. In the past, several countries have organized campaigns to make women aware 
of a decline in fertility with age, but the objective was to stimulate women to have 
children at a younger age. If a similar effort was launched at present, we would expect 
the message to be at least twofold: women should have their children ‘on time’ or freeze 
their eggs on time (Dondorp and de Wert, 2009). Women have not always been very 
receptive towards the message of fertility decline and in fact, there is no significant 
difference in fertility awareness between women who intend to have their first child 
before or after their 30th birthday, which indicates that fertility awareness has little or 
no impact on the average planned age at first birth (Lampic et al., 2006). This does not 
mean, however, that women will be equally unreceptive to the message that oocyte 
cryopreservation is available for them, quite on the contrary. The fact that a better 
knowledge about fertility decline with age does not lead to women reproducing at a 
younger age can be attributed to the fact that family planning is very dependent on 
personal circumstances, as mentioned above. Thus, a decline in fertility is only one of 
many factors that women take into account when balancing the pro’s and con’s of 
reproducing earlier or later in life and only for those women who have a very strong child 
wish will it be a factor that outweighs the others. For other women, the message that they 
should reproduce at a young age will come across as intrusive and pedantic (Williams, 
2005). By adding the possibility to cryopreserve oocytes to the message of fertility decline, 
women may feel helped rather than lectured. 
Not everyone will agree that information campaigns to inform women about the 
possibility to cryopreserve oocytes are warranted, either because the problem (infertility 
due to age) is not grave enough, or simply because one can expect an automatic increase 
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in awareness as private cryobanks will start to offer AGE banking and will advertise their 
services. Private cryobanks have a financial benefit in informing women about a decline 
in their fertility with age and about the option of oocyte cryopreservation as more 
‘customers’ will generate more revenue. Many fertility clinic websites offer correct 
information and are upfront about what their potential customers can expect. However, 
in some cases commercial interests can also taint the information that is conveyed and 
lead to an overly optimistic representation of AGE banking. Women browsing the internet 
in search for information on egg freezing will find claims such as “Egg freezing effectively 
suspends the ever-present ticking of the reproductive biological clock” 
(http://uscfertility.org/fertility_options/egg_freezing/) and “There are now safe, 
successful techniques to preserve a woman’s fertility indefinitely” 
(http://www.infertile.com/infertility-treatments/preserving-your-fertility.htm). Even 
the use of terms such as ‘fertility preservation’ may create the impression that by freezing 
oocytes, a status quo is offered as far as a woman’s reproductive options are concerned. 
However, this is far from true. Every preserved oocyte represents one single chance to 
conceive, not a conception, let alone a baby. For example, Rienzi et al report an ongoing 
implantation rate per warmed oocyte of 12,9% in women with a mean age of 35,5 (Rienzi 
et al., 2010). Cil et al report a 14,1% and a 16,1% live birth rate after vitrification when 
respectively 2 or 6 oocytes are thawed which were banked at age 37 (Cil et al, 2013). In 
this perspective, a lottery ticket would be a better metaphor for a cryopreserved oocyte 
than an insurance policy, especially for women freezing in their late thirties or later. A 
minimum requirement for websites that seek to inform women honestly is that success 
rates are stratified by age. A study by Abusief et al. (2007) shows that in the US, only 52% 
of private fertility clinics and 33% of academic fertility clinics publish success rates based 
on age on their websites. Moreover, only 35% of the former and 22% of the latter clarify 
their definition of success rates. 
A crucial question is to what extent women will be equally receptive to information 
offering them little hope as to information offering them much more hope of a successful 
pregnancy. Chances are that they will deem the centres that present the highest success 
rates and the most optimistic message to be the most competent ones. As Cutting et al. 
(2009) have previously mentioned, “the request for treatment […] and the circumstances 
around it carry emotional and life issues which can impede the ability of patients to hear 
and process the information around oocyte cryopreservation”.   
All things considered, cryobanks will play a large part in creating public awareness in the 
years to come, but to make sure that women have easy access to unbiased information, it 
is preferable that independent health care workers such as general physicians and 
especially gynaecologists who are not connected to centres that offer oocyte 
cryopreservation either actively inform their patients around age 30 when they come for 
check-ups and/or place flyers in their waiting rooms. If gynaecologists discuss the issue 
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of declining fertility and the option of elective freezing with their patients before they 
start to browse the internet for answers, women’s expectations are more likely to be 
realistic and they can be guided in the interpretation of success rates that they will find.  
3.4 Specific data to be offered to candidate-freezers 
After handing them the necessary unbiased information about the procedure, physicians 
or gynaecologists can refer women who express interest in AGE banking to specialized 
fertility centres. It is crucial that these centres present some specific information to 
candidate-freezers and provide individual and independent counselling. In line with the 
suggestions of Cutting et al. (2009), subjects that need to be discussed include the 
following.  
First, rather than ‘overall’ success rates, success rates should be given for the specific age 
of the candidate (at the time of freezing), especially when she is over 35. Hourvitz et al. 
(2009) report clinical pregnancy rates (for regular IVF) of 7,7%, 5,4%, 1,9% and 0% and 
delivery rates of 4,2%, 3,3%, 0,6% and 0% per cycle for women aged 42, 43, 44 and 45, 
respectively. This means that presenting a 44 year old woman with statistics from 42 year 
old women – which seems like a minor age difference – gives her a fourfold 
overestimation of her chances to achieve a clinical pregnancy and an even greater 
overestimation of her chances of a live birth, which illustrates the importance of 
precision in this area.  
Even if ages are specified, success rates in IVF treatment in general are all but 
unambiguous. Statistics can be given on fertilization rates, cleavage rates, implantation 
rates, clinical pregnancy rates, biochemical pregnancy rates, live birth rates, (term) 
singleton live birth rates, per patient, per stimulation cycle, per retrieved oocyte, per 
fresh embryo, per embryo surviving thawing, per embryo transferred or per transfer 
cycle. For a woman to be well informed, she should not be drowned in irrelevant 
information obscuring the rates that actually matter to her personally. A broad discussion 
on this topic has already taken place. For regular IVF, a good standard appears to be the 
term singleton live birth rate per initiated ART cycle (Min et al., 2004) or alternatively the 
live birth rate per ovarian stimulation started (Griesinger et al., 2004), whereby the 
percentage of multiple pregnancies is specified.   
In the specific context of elective oocyte cryopreservation, however, it may be better to 
focus on cumulative birth rates. Unlike ‘standard’ IVF-patients, a social freezer cannot 
take it ‘one cycle at a time’. What a social freezer wants to know is this: “If I freeze 10 (or 
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15, 20, 25,…) oocytes, what are my chances of eventually having a child/children?” Once 
this question is answered, she can move on to the next question: “How many stimulation 
cycles will I (likely) need to obtain the number of oocytes that I want?” Cil et al have made 
calculations regarding the probability of live-birth (singleton+multiple) stratified by age 
and based on either the number of thawed oocytes, the number of injected oocytes and 
the number of embryos transferred (Cil et al, 2013). The minimal acceptable chance of a 
live birth and the maximum number of cycles should essentially be defined by the woman 
herself. The fact that not all IVF patients complete the maximum number of covered 
cycles even when they remain childless, while others take out loans to finance extra 
cycles, illustrates that not all people go to the same lengths to fulfil their child wish. 
However, valuable information can be provided by the fertility clinic on the preferable 
number of oocytes to bank. For example, wheras reproductively speaking older women 
need to bank more oocytes than younger women to obtain the same success rate, a recent 
study by Cobo et al calculated that for women aged 36 or older, banking more than 11 
oocytes no longer increases their chances of success, whereas for women aged 35 or 
younger, the chance of success continues to rise until the 15th oocyte banked (Cobo et al, 
2016). The cumulative live birth rates achieved in their sample with 5, 8 and 15 oocytes in 
the younger group were 15,4%, 40,8% and 85,2%. The cumulative live birth rates achieved 
with 5, 8 and 11 oocytes in the older group were 5,1%, 19,9% and 35,6%. These data can 
help patients make informed choices on whether to bank eggs and on how many 
stimulation cycles to choose for. Although respect for the reproductive decision making 
of the women presenting themselves for AGE banking is of paramount importance, this 
does not mean that reproductive clinics do not have the right to refuse treatment for 
those women whose chances of success are minimal. The exclusion of women above a 
certain age limit can be justified even when women are not deceived about their chances 
of success, as assisting these women would represent a waste of medical resources. A 
study by Rudick et al. (2009) shows that from those centres in the USA that offer AGE 
banking, all programs accept women under the age of 35, half of them accept women aged 
40 and about a third of them is willing to go beyond 40. 
3.5 Specific tests to be offered to candidate-freezers 
In estimating ovarian response and thus the successful aspiration of oocytes and the 
number of cycles needed, predictive tests such as antral follicle count and/or 
antimullerian hormone (AMH) measurements should be offered (Jayaprakasan et al., 
2010). It has been suggested that such tests can also be used to inform women about their 
chances of conceiving – either naturally or by IVF – and about the expected time of onset 
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of infertility and menopause. If they were indeed able to do so, this would be an important 
tool in counselling women who want to cryopreserve their oocytes about how long they 
can ‘wait and see’ and when they should start considering freezing. However, at present, 
data on this subject are inconclusive and further research needs to be conducted to 
determine under which circumstances these tests can be useful. Relying on the currently 
available data, it appears that while they are good indicators of ovarian reserve, these 
tests offer less – if any – insight into the quality of the remaining oocytes as also women 
with undetectable levels of AMH still have a chance of achieving a pregnancy (Broer et 
al., 2009; Guerif, 2009; La Marca, 2010; Riggs et al, 2011; Broer et al, 2013; Gomez et al, 2016; 
Tokura et al, 2013). For women under 35, they are therefore poor predictors of pregnancy 
rates. That being said, at least one study indicates that AMH testing is indicative of 
pregnancy rates in women of advanced age, which is of course of particular importance 
for social freezers (Lee et al., 2009). At present, the best way to counsel candidate freezers 
about their reproductive options is probably to take into consideration a number of 
variables such as age, family history of premature ovarian failure and ovarian reserve as 
measured by antral follicle count or AMH testing.  
3.6 Conclusion 
Given the increased efficiency of oocyte freezing by vitrification and given the reassuring 
data on the health of resulting offspring, the possibility for women to store their oocytes 
theoretically expands their reproductive options and allows them to overcome the 
increasing gap between the optimal age to reproduce from a gynaecological point of view 
and the optimal age to reproduce from a socio-economic point of view. However, the 
average age of women who are currently opting to cryopreserve their oocytes (37 years) 
is too high to achieve a good balance between costs en benefits. If these women believe 
that they are insured against childlessness, they are more often wrong than right. Ideally, 
women in their early thirties who plan to postpone childbearing until their late thirties 
or forties should be informed about the possibility to freeze their eggs. Women whose 
oocytes have already significantly aged and are thus unlikely to benefit from elective 
oocyte cryopreservation should be honestly informed about their success rates and 
should not be specifically targeted. 
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Who pays the bill? 
Who should, who can and who should definitely not pay for egg banking? 
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Chapter 4  
Public funding 
Abstract:  
Despite the initial reactions of disapproval, more and more fertility clinics are now 
offering oocyte cryopreservation to healthy women in order to extend their 
reproductive options. However, so-called ‘social freezing’ or AGE banking is not 
placed on equal footing as ‘regular’ IVF treatments when public funding is 
concerned. In those countries or states where IVF patients receive a number of free 
cycles, we argue that at least the fertilization and transfer cycles of women who 
proactively cryopreserved their oocytes should be covered. Moreover, when the 
argument of justice is consistently applied, coverage should also include the 
expenses of ovarian stimulation, oocyte retrieval and storage. Different modalities 
are possible: full coverage from the onset, reimbursement in cash or 
reimbursement in kind, by offering more free transfer cycles.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Published as: 
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4.1 Introduction 
While acknowledging that the ethical debate on whether AGE banking should be offered 
in the first place is not yet settled in many places, this chapter starts from the observation 
that fertility clinics in several countries, among which the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Belgium, The Netherlands and Israel, now offer AGE banking to women – 
usually highly educated, in their late thirties and single  – who have a strong desire to 
have children, have few fertile years ahead of them but are not ready to embark on 
parenthood just yet. This evolution has led to another morally contentious question, 
namely: who should pay for elective oocyte cryopreservation?  
AGE banking is currently only available for women who are affluent enough to pay for 
the ovarian stimulation drugs, medical procedures, vitrification or slow freezing 
procedure and storage fees. In a small sample (n=29) of women who inquired about oocyte 
banking but eventually decided not to store their eggs, almost half indicate that they 
would have, had the procedure been considerably less expensive (Stoop et al, 2015). 
Although the right to reproduce is widely recognized as a liberty-right, it is generally not 
regarded as a claim-right (Shanner, 1995). In the context of AGE banking, this means that 
while women should have the liberty to cryopreserve their oocytes if they so wish, they 
cannot make claims on society to financially support their efforts to ward of infertility. 
However, many western countries have a healthcare system that covers a certain number 
of IVF-cycles to assure equal access to IVF technology for those who cannot reproduce 
naturally and several US states mandate infertility insurance coverage. This indicates 
that, at least in those jurisdictions, the right to reasonable healthcare is extended to 
fertility treatment (ESHRE Task Force on Ethics and Law, 2008).  
4.2 Should countries with publicly funded IVF extend 
coverage to AGE banking? 
If oocyte cryopreservation is an accepted procedure to counter infertility and if fertility 
treatment is covered by public healthcare, should the logical consequence then be that 
AGE banking is also covered by public healthcare (or mandated insurance coverage) or is 
there a relevant distinction between ‘regular’ IVF and IVF with previously stored oocytes? 
Interestingly, a study by Brezis et al (2011) showed that although laypersons are less open 
to the idea of AGE banking than experts in the field (ART practitioners and bioethicists), 
they are more in favour of including it in insurance coverage than ‘experts’. Also De Groot 
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et al. report that a large proportion of Dutch women who are on a waiting list for AGE 
banking argue that it should be at least partially reimbursed as they believe it will 
improve equal access, will be cost-effective and is justified by the fact that the delay in 
reproduction is at least partially due to societal structures (De Groot et al, 2016).  
For the matter of reimbursement or healthcare coverage, two steps of the AGE banking 
procedure should be considered separately: first, ovarian stimulation, oocyte retrieval, 
cryopreservation and storage and second (several years later), thawing and fertilisation 
of the cryopreserved oocytes. At the time of the first step, women who request AGE 
banking are healthy persons who ask for a procedure that results in stored oocytes that 
may or may not be used, depending on the further course of their lives. At the time of the 
second step, they are patients asking for a medical intervention.  
A woman presenting at the fertility clinic asking for elective oocyte cryopreservation 
thus differs indeed from other IVF patients in a crucial manner: she is not infertile, which 
is in most countries a requirement to receive free IVF cycles. The term ‘elective freezing’ 
puts the focus on the idea that oocyte cryopreservation by healthy women resembles 
other instances of elective medical interventions – such as cosmetic surgery – that 
generally have no therapeutic benefit (unless psychologically). This sparks the sentiment 
that there is no reason why society should finance such ‘whims’ of women who want to 
have it all (cf chapter 1). However, while the line between medical and social 
interventions may serve as a general criterion to reimburse or not, there are many 
exceptions especially in the field of reproduction. Elective abortion, contraception and 
pregnancy care are prime examples (Harwood, 2009). Pregnancy is not a disease but we 
still consider abortion and pregnancy care as medical interventions worthy of coverage. 
Also in the field of medically assisted reproduction, numerous instances (lesbian couples, 
single women, gamete donation etc.) are hard to fit in a definition of ‘medical’. Moreover, 
AGE banking is not a procedure that is devoid of therapeutic benefits. Although it does 
not provide an instant remedy to a medical problem or prevent medical problems from 
occurring (as for vaccination, for example), it can be described as ‘anticipatory’ medicine: 
women anticipate on possible future problems by storing eggs. There is a possible 
therapeutic benefit, but instead of being instant, it is located in the future. A possible 
analogy is the preventive measure of providing iodine pills to people living near a nuclear 
facility to substantially diminish the risk of thyroid cancer in case of a nuclear incident. 
No-one would argue that these pills should not be provided because the persons involved 
are not yet ill or under imminent threat, as when the risk does present itself, it will be too 
late to take the necessary measures (such as distributing iodine pills or banking oocytes). 
When a woman presents herself at the fertility clinic years after the initial egg banking, 
requesting IVF-treatment with her previously stored oocytes, the context shifts from a 
preventive to a curative one. She does not differ from other IVF patients in any crucial 
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manner. For those countries that provide women who are infertile due to advanced age 
with a number of free IVF-cycles paid for by the health care system, it would seem 
straightforward that if these women’s cycles are covered when they use their own fresh 
– but old – oocytes or donor oocytes, they should also be covered when they use their 
own cryopreserved oocytes. This does not only follow from the consistency requirement. 
At the time of use, the patient’s own previously frozen oocytes have practical and ethical 
advantages compared to anonymous donor oocytes or the patient’s ‘fresh’ oocytes, and 
their use should be encouraged. Compared with donor oocytes, there are no concerns 
over the welfare of the donor and the donor-conceived children. Compared with fresh 
but aged oocytes, the success rates and health prospects for the resulting babies are most 
likely better, as most complications in children from (reproductively speaking) older 
mothers are related to the age of the oocyte, rather than to the age of the mother herself. 
If the two-tiered procedure of elective cryopreservation and IVF treatment is regarded as 
a whole, these arguments lead to the conclusion that it should be reimbursed according 
to the same standards as ‘regular’ IVF treatment. However, as both steps are distinct in 
time and as step one (storage) does not necessarily lead to step two (treatment), a more 
nuanced policy may be needed. We will consider the option of offering full coverage, but 
also the alternative options of offering a refund for the first step of the procedure on the 
condition that a woman returns for the second step, either in cash or in kind. 
4.3 Full coverage 
A first option would be to cover AGE banking from the onset, merely setting restrictions 
on factors such as the number of cycles and the woman’s age (in light of a reasonable 
chance of pregnancy), similar to restrictions for regular IVF. This would lower the 
threshold for women to cryopreserve, make the option available to women with lower 
incomes and thus increase fair access. However, an implementation of this strategy would 
mean that the legal requirement in some countries of an infertility diagnosis prior to 
ovarian stimulation cannot be maintained. 
A likely objection to full coverage is that this could be a suboptimal allocation of scarce 
funds. Health care budgets are strained and several countries are already struggling to 
accommodate the present IVF-demand. One would expect that the added costs would not 
be overwhelming. Ovarian stimulation and oocyte retrieval are uncomfortable 
procedures that women will only undertake if they are convinced that they will actually 
benefit from the procedure. Moreover, if all women who have their oocytes frozen would 
use them later on, there would actually be a net benefit if one considers the costs per live 
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birth. The reason behind this is that the live birth rate will be higher when (frozen-
thawed) ‘younger’ eggs are used compared to ‘older’ eggs of subfertile women (Kim et al., 
2010), the miscarriage rate will be lower (Van Loendersloot et al., 2010) and younger 
oocytes will lead to less chromosomal abnormalities in the offspring. Also, women opting 
for AGE banking will need fewer stimulation cycles at a younger age than they will need 
for regular IVF at an older age and there will be no need for stimulation of third party 
donors. ‘Losses’ are only made when cycles are performed for women who do not return 
for treatment and do not donate their oocytes to others. However, three cost-
effectiveness studies, conducted by Van Loendersloot et al. (2011), Hirshfeld-Cytron et al 
(2012a) and by Devine et al (2015) resulted in conflicting results. The (US-based) study of 
Hirshfeld-Cytron et al concludes that AGE banking would result in an additional cost of 
135,520 USD per live birth (and increase the cumulative live birth rate from 72% to 79%), 
the European study of Van Loendersloot et al concluded that if 61% of women return to 
use their oocytes, OC is cost effective at an additional 24 600 USD per live birth (increase 
in live birth rate from 65% to 84%) and (US-based) Devine et al conclude that AGE banking 
decreases the cost per live birth with approximately 15,000 USD (with an increased live 
birth rate from 42% to 62%). As the authors of the first two studies have clarified 
themselves, these differences can be explained by the differences in the scenarios they 
used and differences in costs (Hirshfeld-Cytron et al, 2012b).  
A key factor in establishing cost-effectiveness is to attract the category of women that is 
most likely to benefit from the procedure, meaning those who have a high chance of 
actually returning for treatment and whose oocytes are frozen at a point when they are 
still likely to lead to good fertilization rates. As argued in chapter 3, women who request 
cryopreservation of their oocytes between ages 30 and 35 are most likely to meet these 
criteria. In light of the lower success rates for ‘older’ women, a policy might be envisaged 
that offers full coverage to women younger than, for example, 36. This is the age at which 
Cil et al found the highest discrimination capability for success versus failure (Cil et al, 
2013). However, currently most women who want to cryopreserve their oocytes present 
themselves at a later age. In Hodes-Wertz et al’s sample, 84% of AGE bankers were 36 or 
older (Hodes-Wertz et al, 2013). It is also interesting to note that in a follow-up study by 
Stoop et al of women who banked oocytes (on average) two years prior to the study, only 
half of the women think that they will even use them (Stoop et al, 2015). 
Besides the cost-objection to full coverage, another objection might be that full coverage 
would lead to an increase of women opting for egg banking and to more women 
postponing motherhood. Whether the possibility of oocyte cryopreservation will cause a 
postponement of motherhood is debatable and will only be confirmed or refuted if and 
when elective freezing becomes widely available. One should always keep in mind, 
however, that when women choose to store oocytes and postpone motherhood, they do 
this because in their eyes, the circumstances for raising a child may or will be better at a 
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later point in their lives than at the present (as discussed in previous chapters). Thus, the 
possibility that more women will postpone motherhood is not a valid argument against 
public funding, unless one starts from the premise that children are always better off 
being born to a young mother than to an older one, regardless of the circumstances. This 
is not a plausible premise. Again, most women who opt for AGE banking postpone 
motherhood for lack of a partner (Nekkebroeck et al., 2010; Hodes-Wertz et al, 2013; Stoop 
et al, 2015; Cobo et al, 2016). It is not particularly convincing to argue that it is better for 
these women to become single mothers at age 35 than sharing parenthood with a partner 
at age 40.  
The fact that more women would be inclined to cryopreserve their oocytes at a young age 
can in contrast also be regarded as a desirable evolution in the sense that a greater 
number of the women who postpone motherhood will have young oocytes available to 
them and thus fewer will have to rely on donor oocytes. Another positive consequence 
on a societal level is that more donor oocytes will become available for those women who 
did not freeze proactively, as there will always be a certain percentage of women who 
store their oocytes but eventually do not return for IVF treatment. Moreover, this new 
source of donor oocytes would have fewer ethical objections attached to them, as one can 
be sure that the donor voluntarily underwent the ovarian stimulation and oocyte 
retrieval procedure (see chapter 6). In fact, women who have taken the step to 
cryopreserve oocytes at one point, but have ultimately decided to remain childless or 
whose child wish has been fulfilled, have a perfect donor profile in yet another sense, as 
they realize how important a child wish can be, but at the same time no longer have an 
interest in using their oocytes themselves. Of course, it is important that women who 
want to donate when their cryostorage ends are properly counselled about this important 
decision and are warned that they may later be confronted with their genetic offspring. 
This, however, also applies to egg sharers and current oocyte donors.  
4.4 Partial coverage 
Another option is to cover only the second step of the procedure. In this scenario, the 
retrieval and storage of oocytes would be paid for by the woman herself, as she requests 
an elective procedure without immediate necessity. Oocyte thawing, fertilization and 
transfer cycles would be covered by the same principles of ‘regular’ IVF since the woman 
is at that point indiscernible from other IVF-patients. The logic of this scheme is that 
health insurance only kicks in when a ‘medical’ problem (infertility) presents itself, and 
at that time the best treatment option is chosen: either IVF with fresh oocytes from the 
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patient, IVF with donor oocytes, or IVF with previously frozen oocytes from the patient. 
If the data on the health of children resulting from cryopreserved oocytes continues to 
be reassuring, the latter option is most likely to be the best option. When cryopreserved 
oocytes are already available, the patient does not require ovarian stimulation, she does 
not need to rely on donor oocytes and there is a smaller chance of chromosomal 
abnormalities in the offspring.  
Although this solution is in line with current practice and appears to be logical, it is not 
fair towards the women who decide to freeze their oocytes. In hindsight, a woman who 
did not cryopreserve eggs at a younger age will be covered for both steps of the 
procedure, while a woman who was more foreseeing and decided to freeze her eggs 
beforehand is only covered for the second – and cheapest – step. Moreover, the former’s 
procedure is likely to involve more risks for the resulting children and is less cost-
effective.  
4.5 Cash back 
This unfairness could be corrected either by offering women a refund for the first step of 
their IVF-treatment provided that they also undergo the second step and thus complete 
the procedure. As noted by Stoop (2010), “it would be illogic not to reimburse these 
women when using their vitrified oocytes once they are faced with infertility while 
women of the same age get fresh IVF treatments fully covered.” The refund could either 
only cover ovarian stimulation and oocyte retrieval, or also include the costs related to 
storage.  
This cash back system appears to be the most fair, but there are also some downsides to 
this approach. As the moment when a woman first pays for the retrieval and storage of 
her oocytes and the moment when she would be refunded are several years apart, the 
refund of several thousands of Euros/dollars will be experienced as a considerable 
financial ‘bonus’. Whereas now, women only turn to IVF after trying to conceive 
naturally, they may be tempted to request IVF treatment with their previously 
cryopreserved oocytes (rather than trying to achieve a natural conception) for reasons of 
financial gain. At first sight, this appears to be a case of ‘overuse’ of medical resources. 
Demanding an infertility diagnosis before women can undergo covered IVF-cycles and 
claim the refund is not a guarantee to prevent this. Infertility is not a disease that is easily 
diagnosed and often remains unexplained and clinically undetectable. The common 
definition of infertility is the absence of pregnancy after a year of regular unprotected 
intercourse, but it is impossible for a physician to check this criterion. 
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One can however argue about whether or not giving preference to the previously stored 
oocytes really is a case of problematic use of medical resources. Offering (frozen oocyte) 
replacement cycles to a 40-year woman whose ovarian reserve is not yet depleted can 
also be considered as less ethically challenging than pushing her to reproduce naturally 
with higher chances of miscarriage and chromosomal abnormalities in the resulting child 
while she has ‘young’ oocytes in storage. Which is the best scenario (using the banked 
oocytes as a first line treatment or as a last resort) will depend on patient specific 
characteristics, such as the status of her ovarian reserve once she returns and on the 
number of children she desires to have. For most patients, the ideal scenario, however, 
would be attempting natural conception first, then ‘regular’ IVF and as a final step IVF 
with banked oocytes, as this sequence maximises the overall chances of achieving 
parenthood (Stoop et al, 2016). 
4.6 More free transfer cycles 
A final strategy might be not to offer a refund in cash for women who request IVF 
treatment with previously frozen oocytes, but to offer them a refund in kind, more 
specifically a number of additional transfer cycles. The cost of thawing, fertilization and 
transfer of the embryo is considerably lower than the cost of a full IVF cycle and thus 
many more replacement cycles can be offered for the same price. In this kind of 
arrangement, women are not financially motivated to undergo IVF while they are still 
fertile. A practical disadvantage of this scheme is that coverage is generally calculated per 
stimulation cycle, not per transfer cycle. One would need to compare the total cost of an 
IVF cycle (which usually includes several replacement cycles for fresh and thawed 
oocytes or embryos) to the cost of thawing, fertilization and replacement in order to 
determine how many transfer cycles would equal the price of an average full IVF cycle.  
In countries that already cover several IVF cycles, this arrangement loses a lot of its 
appeal as women who opt for elective freezing are unlikely to need these ‘extra’ transfer 
cycles. Still, although there is no perfect equality of both groups (IVF patients of advanced 
age with or without previously cryopreserved oocytes), there is at least an attempt to 
limit the inequality. 
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4.7 Which strategy is most sound? 
Of the four strategies that we discussed, the one that presents the biggest challenge to 
the values of justice and equality is partial funding, which is in fact common practice at 
present. From the proposed alternatives, the cash back-system is expected to be the most 
appealing one as it is cost-effective, no public money is ‘wasted’ on unnecessary medical 
procedures, it is compatible with the widespread legal requirement that IVF cycles are 
only covered when there is a diagnose of infertility and it is fair when comparing women 
faced with age-related infertility who did previously cryopreserve their oocytes to those 
who did not. However, it is not a fair system when one compares women who freeze and 
return for treatment to those who do not return. We might imagine two single women 
who freeze their eggs at age 34, hoping to find their Mister Right soon without being 
forced to have children with the first man that comes along. One finds a partner to share 
parenthood with and returns for treatment at age 38, while the other remains single, does 
not want to be a single mother and therefore does not return for treatment. Only the first 
woman will be reimbursed, although there is no morally relevant reason that sets her 
apart from the second, other than that she was more lucky. As such, the second woman 
actually suffers a ‘double loss’. 
Whether the fourth strategy (extra transfer cycles) offers an actual advantage or not will 
depend largely on the local context. In Belgium, for example, six IVF cycles are covered 
by public health insurance. Taking into consideration that each of these six started cycles 
represents several transfer cycles, it is very unlikely that patients would benefit from 
extra cycles. In places where only one or two cycles are free of charge, however, extra 
free replacement cycles will often be useful. 
Also the appeal of the first strategy – full coverage – will depend on local factors. While it 
is a fair system that would improve the live birth rate for women treated for age-onset 
infertility, the public healthcare system probably will not want to add women who 
request AGE banking to the waiting lists of women who are already subfertile and who 
are sure to want IVF treatment. In countries where there are no waiting lists, however, 
full coverage up to a certain age would send a clear message that those who want to bank 
their oocytes better do it when their chances of success are still reasonably high.  
On a policy level, a systematic analysis of these local legal and contextual factors should 
be undertaken in order to determine which strategy is the most ‘fair’ for all parties 
involved, given the local context. Even a combination of several policies might be 
envisaged. For example, for a country such as Belgium, we could imagine a system in 
which women who cryopreserve their oocytes before age 36 are covered in full, while 
women who cryopreserve their oocytes at a higher age would only be covered for 
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fertilization and transfer. Such a policy may be justified based on a trade-off between 
considerations regarding equity of access, cost-effectiveness and public education 
(namely: that oocyte freezing is best done before age 36). In the UK, by contrast, a system 
that offers more free transfer cycles might be the better choice when there are already 
many infertile couples on the waiting lists.   
4.8 Conclusion 
Although elective oocyte cryopreservation is being offered by an increasing number of 
fertility clinics, it is far from clear what its place is – or should be – within systems that 
offer a number of free IVF cycles. If women who have proactively cryopreserved their 
oocytes return for treatment at a point when they can no longer conceive naturally and 
have not reached the maximum age limit for embryo transfer, they should be treated on 
equal terms as other IVF patients and also receive free treatment. It is less 
straightforward, however, whether or not the covered cycles should include the first step 
of the procedure, namely the costs related to ovarian stimulation, oocyte retrieval, oocyte 
freezing (/vitrification) and storage. Although paying for elective procedures is 
counterintuitive, there may be good reasons to argue for full coverage from the onset in 
specific contexts. Alternatively, a cash back system or more free transfer cycles could be 
considered. The preferred strategy will often depend on local legal and contextual factors.  
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Chapter 5  
Company benefit 
Abstract:  
Purpose - A critical ethical analysis of the initiative of several companies to cover 
the costs of oocyte cryopreservation for their healthy employees. The main 
research question is whether such policies promote or confine women’s 
reproductive autonomy. 
Results - A distinction needs to be made between the ethics of AGE banking in itself 
and the ethics of employers offering it to their employees. Although the utility of 
the former is expected to be low, there are few persuasive arguments to deny access 
to oocyte cryopreservation to women who are well informed about the procedure 
and the success rates. However, it does not automatically follow that it would be 
ethically unproblematic for employers to offer egg banking to their employees. 
Conclusions - For these policies to be truly ‘liberating’, a substantial number of 
conditions need to be fulfilled, which can be reduced to three categories: (1) women 
should understand the benefits, risks and limitations, (2) women should feel no 
pressure to take up the offer; (3) the offer should have no negative effect on other 
family-friendly policies and should in fact be accompanied by such policies. 
Fulfilling these conditions may turn out to be impossible. Thus, regardless of 
companies’ possible good intentions, women’s reproductive autonomy is not well 
served by offering them company-sponsored AGE banking. 
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5.1 Introduction 
In October 2014, the media reported that Facebook and Apple are including oocyte 
cryopreservation in their employee benefit package (up to 20,000 USD) and that women 
had started taking up this opportunity (Friedman, 2014). Other companies have since 
voiced their intentions to follow suit or introduced the same policy, for example 
Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, Google and law firms (Bennett, 2014; Robertson, 2014). The 
most important reasons why employers typically offer perks and (health) benefits to their 
employees is to attract and retain good employees and to make sure they remain healthy 
(and thus productive). In this case, although the offer is healthcare-related, the former 
motive is said to apply to the case of egg freezing. In Silicon Valley, competition for talent 
is extremely high, resulting in tremendous efforts of the different companies to go above 
and beyond when perks and benefits are concerned. Knowing that it is difficult for 
educated women to combine their career and family plans – not to mention the wage 
penalty that young mothers face (Buckles, 2008) – the rationale is that young promising 
women will be charmed by the option of putting their fertility ‘on ice’ and thus choose 
for those employers that include egg freezing in their benefit package. However, these 
new policies were ill received by many and the intentions of Facebook and Apple were 
widely questioned. The most common reproach is that the offer is actually not intended 
to be a benefit for the employee, but rather for the employer, as childless employees have 
more time available to invest in their jobs. This chapter does not aim to uncover the ‘true 
intentions’ of employers offering egg freezing, but does aim to make a critical ethical 
analysis of the pros and cons of this new (alleged) benefit in terms of women’s 
reproductive liberty.  
5.2 Preceding debate on ‘social egg freezing’ or AGE banking 
It is important to highlight that even outside the context of employment, oocyte 
cryopreservation for healthy women is still controversial, despite its wide availability. As 
was argued in previous chapters, reasons to principally oppose the possibility for healthy 
women to bank their oocytes are lacking and are particularly unconvincing as cancer 
patients are actively encouraged to preserve their fertility. Whether one’s fertility is 
threatened by disease, therapy or age is irrelevant, if women want to take proactive 
measures to preserve their fertility, they should be able to do so regardless of the cause 
of the perceived threat to their fertility. However, that does not mean that there are no 
reasons for concern regarding how the procedure might be marketed to women and 
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regarding the information and counseling that is available to the women who express 
their interest in egg freezing (see chapter 3). Women of advanced reproductive age should 
be honestly informed about the (low) success rates they can expect and young women 
should be informed that postponing childbearing will always reduce their chances of 
becoming parents, even if their oocytes are banked. Although the ASRM has outlined clear 
guidelines regarding the information that should be provided to candidate egg bankers 
(ASRM, 2008), the information that is made available on fertility clinics’ websites has been 
reported to be deplorable (Avraham et al, 2014).  
While banking oocytes for AGE-banking promises to increase women’s reproductive 
autonomy, reduce the incidence of involuntary childlessness and reduce the need for 
donor oocytes, an important limitation is that these benefits are difficult to predict in 
individual cases. Some women will bank their eggs without ever needing them, some will 
bank their eggs but will not succeed in establishing a pregnancy, some will not bank and 
wish they had later on. Increasing the utility is difficult. High utility requires that good 
quality eggs are banked and that many women return to thaw and fertilize them. 
However, these two factors are inversely correlated. In order to bank good quality oocytes 
with high chances of a live birth, women should ideally bank eggs at the peak of their 
fertility. However, women who bank eggs at a young age are not very likely to need them 
as they still have a lot of time ahead of them to reproduce naturally. Women in their late 
thirties have a lot less fertile years ahead of them and are thus more likely to face a 
depletion of their ovarian reserve once they attempt to establish a pregnancy. However, 
the quality of their oocytes has already diminished. This means that – merely based on 
utility – there is only a very small fragment of the population that we ought not to 
discourage from banking their oocytes, somewhere between the ages of 30 and 35. 
Moreover, even for this population, the previous remark that postponing always reduces 
the chances of a successful pregnancy (with or without banked oocytes) remains valid. 
Thus, for women who have a strong desire for parenthood and who have found the 
partner they want to share parenthood with, egg banking is never the preferred option. 
This very small category of women who may potentially benefit from egg banking 
contrasts sharply with the way egg banking is marketed as the next big step in women’s 
reproductive liberty and as the ultimate road to ‘having it all’ (that is, a family and a 
career). Egg freezing cocktail parties and flyers reading “Working, shopping, egg 
freezing?” seem to suggest that virtually all women, but especially those with higher 
education, should take up the opportunity of egg banking, either as a deliberate life plan, 
or as an insurance policy ‘just in case’. 
Fertility clinics are therefore accused of misrepresenting the costs and benefits and of 
offering this expensive procedure with a low utility merely with their own financial 
interests in mind, rather than the best interests of their patients/clients. This idea is 
reinforced by the fact that most women who bank their eggs today do not match the 
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stereotype of the wise, proactive women banking good quality oocytes, but rather of the 
(reproductively speaking) older single women desperately trying to hold on to the last 
couple of (reduced quality) oocytes they have left so that they can be fertilized if and 
when Mr Right comes along (see chapter 1). However, there is an important remark to be 
made here. Both personal stories in popular media (Richards, 2013; McCarthy, 2015) and 
a study by Stoop et al (2015) suggest that an aspect of AGE-banking that has not received 
its fair share of attention is the psychological effect it has on women. More specifically, a 
recurring story is that – unlike men – women in their thirties feel substantial pressure to 
find their significant other before the end of their fertility and some report being faced 
with the dilemma of either ‘settling’ for a partner despite having doubts about the 
relationship or continue looking for the perfect match while risking remaining childless 
(Waldby, 2015). In the Belgian study, 32% of the respondents indicated that they banked 
their oocytes because they wanted to take away the pressure to find a partner and 49% 
indicated that they wanted to give themselves more time to find a partner (Stoop et al, 
2015). Another psychological effect that has previously been described in the setting of 
ART is the phenomenon of anticipated decision regret (Tymstra, 2007). Women want to 
have the idea that they ‘tried everything’ in order not to feel regrets later (Daniluk, 2001; 
De Groot et al, 2016). This is also a major reason for resorting to egg banking (Stoop et al, 
2015). These psychological factors also explain why – both in the setting of egg banking 
and in the ART-setting in general – even those for whom the treatment was not clinically 
successful (that is: did not result in a healthy live birth) seldom regret having undergone 
the procedure (Stoop et al, 2015; Daniluk, 2001), despite the significant cost and efforts. 
5.3 Pros of company-sponsored egg freezing 
How does the offer of employers to cover the costs of AGE-banking affect this debate?  
First, it counters the concern for exploitation. If not a woman herself, but rather her 
employer or (work related) health insurer would pay for the procedure, one cannot say 
that vulnerable women at the verge of losing their fertility are being exploited in the 
sense that they are tricked into paying a large sum of money to buy a false sense of 
security.  
Second, it counters the reproach that the average woman opting for AGE-banking is too 
old. We can expect the average age of women who would bank their eggs through their 
health insurance or employer to be lower than the age at which women are banking 
today. Most women delay the significant financial investment until the moment they are 
relatively sure they will eventually ‘cash in’ on it (that is: use their banked oocytes), which 
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is per definition not at the peak of their fertility. The younger a woman is, however, the 
more optimistic she will be about being able to start building a family before she loses her 
fertility and thus the less inclined she will be to invest a large sum of money into egg 
banking. If the cost of the investment is no longer an element to be taken into 
consideration, even women who are less worried about finding a partner ‘in time’ may 
become interested in banking, which will lower the average age and thus raise the quality 
of the banked eggs. This is not to say that we should expect a massive uptake and thus an 
overconsumption of medical services, as the procedure remains physically burdensome 
and is thus not something that women will undergo on a whim. 
Another effect could be that the profile of banking women may change on a different level 
than age alone (although this remains a hypothesis). At present, virtually all women who 
are cryopreserving their oocytes are single and lack of a suitable partner has repeatedly 
been identified as the main reason for egg freezing (Baldwin et al, 2014). If companies 
start covering it, more women may consider AGE banking in combination with the 
deliberate postponement of parenthood as a means to achieve their professional 
aspirations. If this shift would occur based on company policies, several conclusions can 
be drawn, of which at least two speak in favor of company-sponsored egg banking. First, 
in terms of utility one might consider this to be a positive evolution, as this would provide 
a cohort of egg bankers who freeze young but have no intention of trying to establish a 
pregnancy naturally in their fertile years and are thus more likely to return to use their 
banked oocytes after their reproductive lifespan. Second, in terms of justice, one might 
argue that if women dedicate their most fertile years to their careers, it is only fair that 
their employer – who benefits from the delay to parenthood – bears the costs of their 
attempt to safeguard their fertility for the future.  
Last but not least, we should mention on the pro-side of the debate that in principle, the 
possibility for women to bank eggs regardless of their financial situation can be said to 
expand their reproductive autonomy. Stoop et al (2015) documented that financial 
considerations are a barrier to AGE banking for a significant portion of the women who 
inquired about the procedure but eventually decided against banking. In their study, 13 
out of 29 women would have banked had the procedure been significantly less expensive. 
From this perspective, external financing would bring an additional reproductive option 
within reach for a larger number of women. Many women will have no need for this 
benefit, but for others it may be a welcome alternative for rushing into parenthood under 
suboptimal circumstances (lack of a stable relationship, financial instability, demanding 
job responsibilities,…).This need not necessarily be framed in terms of reproductive 
autonomy, but in terms of autonomy ‘tout court’, as it may have a significant effect on 
many aspects of a woman’s life. This idea fits nicely into a branch of feminism that has 
been labeled neoliberal feminism, faux feminism or ‘lean in feminism’. This last term 
refers to a bestselling book by Sheryl Sandberg, the current COO of… Facebook (Sandberg, 
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2014). Sandberg’s aim is to inspire young women to become leaders in today’s society and 
in aspiring to lead, they should not be deterred by the seeming incompatibility between 
family and career. Although she does not specifically address the topic of egg banking, it 
is not hard to see how egg banking fits in this rhetoric. Also feminist scholar Marcia 
Inhorn called upon young female academics to consider freezing their eggs so that they 
can postpone motherhood until after they have landed their first tenure-track job 
(Inhorn, 2013). 
5.4 Cons of company-sponsored egg freezing 
Not all feminists are convinced that egg banking has a liberating effect on women though, 
quite to the contrary, radical feminists tend to be diametrically opposed to Sandberg’s 
new feminist ideology (Petropanagos, 2010; Catapan et al, 2014; Baylis, 2015). As Françoise 
Baylis wrote, “oocyte cryopreservation as an employee benefit is not only 
counterproductive but offensive. It not only fails to empower young women, it actually 
disempowers them by overtly entrenching the otherwise subtle message that women 
who have babies are not serious about their careers” (Baylis, 2015). Next, she calls on 
those companies that offer egg banking to exchange this measure for an employee benefit 
package that is ‘truly family-friendly’. 
The accusation that Facebook and Apple are not family-friendly companies is not entirely 
appropriate, as many of the leading companies in silicon valley and Facebook in particular 
are exemplary in this regard, despite the fact that they are under no legal obligation to 
provide even a single day of paid maternity leave. However, as other companies start 
copying Facebook in offering egg banking, it is very doubtful that they will be as eager to 
copy Facebook’s 4 months of paid maternity and paternity leave (also for same-sex 
couples and adoptive parents), financial assistance in IVF and adoption procedures, 
designated breast-feeding rooms or the 4000 USD ‘baby cash’ when their fulltime 
employees become parents. As long as the company supports both having children and 
delaying childbirth, one might argue that they are not pushing their employees in a 
certain direction. However when the investment in egg banking is not accompanied by 
child-friendly policies or is even introduced at the expense of such policies, there is a 
clear message that the employer prefers the employee to defer childbearing. The worry 
that is expressed by Baylis and others that women will be disempowered may therefore 
indeed by a legitimate concern. 
Ideally, the benefits and perks that are offered in the sphere of family building should 
remove constraints and thus offer employees a greater liberty in choosing the path in life 
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that they desire. IVF coverage is a good example. It makes IVF accessible to people who 
might not be able to afford it otherwise but there is no reason to believe that IVF coverage 
would push employees towards IVF against their will. Employees thus only stand to gain 
from such a policy. This is less straightforward when it comes to coverage for egg banking. 
In this case, the offer may cause women to defer childbearing against their better 
judgment for a short term gain, namely to buy credit from their employer in the hope to 
land a promotion. At the end of the day, however, these women may find themselves in a 
situation in which they have in fact sacrificed, rather than safeguarded their fertility by 
banking their eggs if none of their banked eggs leads to a healthy live birth or if they do 
not have enough oocytes in storage to reach the desired family size. Those who bank eggs 
as a last resort have nothing to lose, but those – such as young employees in a stable 
relationship – who deliberately adjust their life plans relying on their frozen fertility do, 
as egg banking may give them a false sense of security.  
Even without the offer of egg banking, the labor market is not always well organized to 
cope with mothers (and dedicated fathers) on the work floor, let alone in the board room. 
At the same time, few human desires are so little questioned and so widely respected as 
the desire to become a parent – not to say that even in Western societies, choosing not to 
become a mother is still oftentimes frowned upon, rather than the other way around 
(Ashburn-Nardo, 2017). Thus, up until recently, although the pregnancies of women in 
their thirties may have been impractical for their employers, they had a valid ‘excuse’ to 
become pregnant: it was now or never. Furthermore, employers had an incentive to make 
life as comfortable as possible for parenting employees, for example in allowing flexible 
working hours or support in daycare, in order not to loose them. With the availability of 
egg banking, the ‘now or never’-excuse is no longer valid as it presents another additional 
option for perpetual postponers (Berrington, 2004). While it might have been ‘not done’ 
to ask of employees to forego parenthood in light of their professional obligations, is 
appears more acceptable to ask of employees to merely postpone parenthood. As age 
limits apply in most countries for embryo transfer, and as women banking their eggs 
indicate themselves that they (on average) intend to establish a pregnancy before their 
43rd birthday (Stoop et al, 2015), women will not postpone motherhood until after their 
retirement though. Also, these ‘older’ mothers in the workforce may be even less 
dispensable than their younger counterparts. These two factors indicate that family-
friendly policies would still be needed and might still be implemented. However, this 
optimism has limits. If the average age at first childbirth should rise in companies offering 
egg banking, they will end up with a smaller segment of employees who are parents and 
smaller groups are less likely to be catered to. It is thus not far-fetched to suggest that the 
offer of egg banking may turn out to be at the expense of family-friendly policies. What 
the impact will be of company-sponsored egg banking on postponement is, however, 
uncertain at present. Somewhat reassuring studies in this regard are those by Hakim 
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(2003) and Van Balen (2005), both indicating that a strong desire to have children 
overrides motivations to postpone motherhood. However, for the large group of women 
who have a less urgent desire for parenthood, the offer of egg banking ‘free of charge’ 
may influence their decision to postpone conceiving a child.  
This brings us to another possible problem when egg banking is offered by employers, 
namely neutral provision of the necessary information and non-directive counseling. Just 
to give one example, it would be very relevant that the employee knows that she will need 
ICSI (with the associated cost) to fertilize her stored eggs a couple of years down the road 
and whether or not this will also be covered by her employer/health care provider or not. 
This and other information about the technicalities, success rates and possible risks need 
to be provided by a neutral person who is not affiliated with the company paying for the 
procedure. Information provision by the employer involves a conflict of interest that is 
to be avoided. 
A final ethical con against company-sponsored egg freezing is that this benefit might 
result in a situation in which employees become indebted to their company and that their 
company holds a certain power over them in a very private way. Much will depend on the 
specifics of the agreement, for example on whether or not a woman is required to 
reimburse her employer if she leaves the company the day after banking her eggs and 
whether or not the employer is aware of which employees have or have not taken up the 
opportunity of banking. Also, certain expectations will be present towards the women 
who bank eggs, in particular the expectation that they will not become pregnant 
immediately after banking. Also here, the specific practical details are determining. If the 
employer does not have any access to the medical records of the employees, even for 
those procedures that are covered by the company’s health insurance, these expectation 
will not be present. 
5.5 Conclusion 
What are we to conclude after analyzing the pros and cons of companies offering AGE 
banking to their employees? Is it the final step in female liberation now that the women 
working for these companies not only have the theoretical possibility of putting their 
fertility on ice, but also the practical means? Or does it increase the (potentially 
internalized) oppression of women by increasing the likelihood that they will not only be 
free to postpone parenthood, but pushed to do so against their better judgment? There is 
no clear answer to these questions as a lot will depend on the practical details of the 
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agreement between employer and employee and on the personal circumstances of each 
separate individual.  
What is clear, however, is that for these policies to be truly ‘liberating’, a substantial 
number of conditions need to be fulfilled, which can be reduced to three categories. 
Company-sponsored egg freezing would be liberating if and only if (1) women understand 
the benefits, risks and – perhaps most importantly amidst the hype – limitations (cf. the 
SART/ASRM guidelines), (2) women feel no pressure to take up the offer (whether or not 
a woman banks her eggs should thus not have any influence on her career opportunities); 
(3) the offer has no negative effect on other family-friendly policies and is in fact 
accompanied by such policies. These conditions should lead to a situation in which (1) (on 
a personal level) only those women bank their eggs for whom – all things considered – 
this is their best available option of achieving the life goals that are most important to 
them personally (which should be very few women) and (2) (on a societal level) women 
remain free to have their children while they are young, without suffering serious 
professional setbacks. If companies take these requirements seriously, they will have to 
invest a lot of time and effort in fulfilling them and many will argue that they are 
impossible to fulfill. Thus, regardless of companies’ possible good intentions, women’s 
reproductive autonomy is more often than not ill-served by offering them company-
sponsored AGE banking. 
But, to all sincerely feminist companies, there is also an easy way to comply: do not 
include egg banking in your benefit package, but use the funds to make it easier for 
women to balance professional and parental obligations and make sure your female 
employees earn enough money so that those who want to, can finance egg banking 
themselves and can deliberate on its merits in private. 
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Chapter 6  
Implications of oocyte cryostorage for the practice 
of oocyte donation 
Abstract:  
As the efficiency of oocyte cryopreservation increased rapidly in recent years, 
oocytes are currently being stored either in the course of IVF-treatments, or as a 
fertility preservation measure. These practices may have an impact on the number 
of available donor oocytes due to two different dynamics: first, a certain percentage 
of women for whom oocytes were cryopreserved will eventually not use their eggs 
and may decide to donate them to others; second, especially in the practice of AGE 
banking, women may opt to donate a part of the retrieved oocytes in ‘freeze and 
share’ schemes in order to reduce the costs. In this article, we aim to sketch the 
ethical implications of such developments in general and the issue of payment to 
oocyte donors in particular. 
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6.1 Introduction 
Oocytes may be cryopreserved in a number of circumstances: during the course of an IVF-
treatment, at the request of women whose fertility is threatened by diseases or aggressive 
medical treatments (so-called ‘medical freezing’), at the request of women who fear 
infertility due to aging (AGE banking) or in the context of egg banks for fertility 
treatment. These practices may have an impact on the number of available donor oocytes 
due to different dynamics. First, donor egg banking allows the oocytes of one donor (or 
one stimulation cycle) to be distributed between different recipients in smaller batches, 
which results in a more efficient allocation and a lower cost for the recipients (Robertson, 
2014). Second, a certain percentage of women for whom oocytes were cryopreserved with 
the intent of autologous use will eventually not use their eggs and may decide to donate 
them to others. Third, especially in the practice of AGE banking, women may opt to 
donate a part of the retrieved oocytes in ‘freeze and share’ schemes in order to reduce 
the costs. For the purpose of this dissertation, I will not look into this first dynamic, which 
was already discussed by Robertson (2014), but rather the second and third, which is 
relevant for women who resort to AGE banking. The ethical implications of these 
developments in general and the issue of payment to oocyte donors in particular will be 
discussed. I will start by sketching the situation for donation for reproductive purposes 
and look into donation for research purposes at the end of the chapter. 
As a preliminary remark, it must be pointed out that the implications of this potential 
new source of donor oocytes on the practice of oocyte donation will be more pronounced 
for those countries where patients are currently faced with waiting lists for IVF treatment 
with donor oocytes as more oocytes will shorten those waiting lists. In, amongst others, 
the US, Spain, and some East European countries, this is not an issue. However, as we will 
show, even in such countries, there still may be a significant impact on certain aspects of 
the practice of oocyte donation, including the price of oocyte donation cycles.  
6.2 Oocytes cryopreserved during IVF treatment 
In the course of IVF treatments, it is common practice to harvest more oocytes than can 
be fertilised and replaced in one cycle. Currently, most fertility centres opt to fertilise all 
the available oocytes and cryopreserve the high quality embryos that are not transferred 
in the first cycle. However, as these embryos ‘belong’ to two individuals, disagreements 
may arise over their disposition. Now that the efficiency of oocyte cryopreservation 
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(through vitrification) equals that of embryo cryopreservation, it may thus be wiser to 
freeze oocytes instead of embryos (although this practice will probably be less cost-
effective as a certain percentage of oocytes will be frozen, but will eventually fail to 
fertilize). Other reasons for freezing oocytes rather than embryos include legal 
restrictions on the storage of embryos (such as in Italy), religious/ethical objections of 
the patients or the inability of the male partner to produce semen at the time of oocyte 
retrieval. In recent years, many clinics are also starting to adopt a freeze-all strategy (with 
an hCG-free protocol) in order to avoid ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome and increase 
IVF success rates (Evans et al, 2014; Roque, 2015). In such a protocol both embryos or 
oocytes can be cryopreserved, both with its own benefits and drawbacks(Devroey et al, 
2011; Mertes and Pennings, 2011).  
6.3 Deciding to donate 
Regardless of the reason why oocytes are frozen during the course of IVF treatment, a 
number of these oocytes will remain unused due to a myriad of reasons and will thus 
become surplus or spare oocytes. In the years after egg storage, women may have 
completed their family through natural conception or IVF with other oocytes, pass away, 
break up with their partner or abandon their desire to have children. The same 
disposition options should be offered for these spare oocytes as for spare embryos after 
IVF treatment: prolonged storage, disposal, donation to other couples or donation to 
research.  
We expect less reluctance to donate oocytes to other IVF patients when spare eggs are 
already in storage than when a woman has to undergo the stimulation and retrieval 
procedures specifically for the purpose of donation or when donation implies a decrease 
in the woman’s own chance of conceiving (such as in egg sharing). At present, few women 
are keen to come forward as donors unless when directed (or cross-) donation to a friend 
or family member is concerned, or when donors receive a personal benefit, either in cash 
or in kind (in egg sharing schemes). Potential donors need to overcome a double 
threshold: the first regards the physically demanding procedures of ovarian stimulation 
and oocyte retrieval, the second regards the psychological burden of becoming the 
genetic parent of a child that one does not know.  
For women who already have spare oocytes in storage, the first threshold is removed. In 
this case the decision to donate does not imply any extra physical hardship. Some 
additional testing for infectious or hereditary diseases may be requested, but the effort 
will be minimal compared to the oocyte stimulation and retrieval procedure itself. 
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However, the psychological threshold remains largely intact. Many – if not most – women 
find the idea of having a genetic child grow up in an unknown family emotionally 
troubling, and therefore, even if the physical burden is lifted, it is unlikely that large 
numbers of women with spare oocytes will be donating them for reproductive purposes. 
Nevertheless, the percentage of women who choose donation may be higher for spare 
oocytes than for spare embryos. First, the donation of oocytes appears to be less 
emotionally troubling due to the different narratives that, for example, link eggs to cells 
and embryos to children (Kirkman, 2003; de Lacey, 2005). Whether this distinction is 
rational (as both donated oocytes and donated embryos have the potential to become 
genetic children of the donor) is disputable, but that does not change the observation that 
the experience for donors is different. Second, one of the reasons why couples do not 
donate their embryos to other IVF patients is that they are a symbol of their partnership 
(Provoost et al, 2009). This objection to donation does not arise for oocytes.  
If there is a trend to cryopreserve oocytes rather than embryos, even a small percentage 
of donations might be sufficient to meet the current demand. As a general indication, in 
2010 25,187 egg donation cycles were reported to the ESHRE registry (representing 991 
clinics in 31 European countries) and there were 15,504 donor oocyte transfer cycles (with 
an average of 2 embryos per transfer) in the US (SART, 2012; Kupka et al, 2014). Practical 
advantages of using oocytes that are already in storage, rather than relying on fresh 
oocytes are, for example, that there is no need to synchronise the cycles of donor and 
recipient, that the number of available oocytes is known beforehand so that oocytes of 
one donor can be directed to several recipients and that donors can be tested for 
infectious diseases after the window period. An ethical advantage is that healthy women 
do not need to be subjected to the procedures of ovarian stimulation and oocyte retrieval, 
which are not beneficial for their own health, and which may – in seldom cases – even be 
harmful to them. These advantages also hold true in places where there is no donor 
oocyte shortage, meaning that even in those places the availability of spare frozen 
oocytes may have an impact on the practice of oocyte donation. 
A practical disadvantage of relying on IVF patients as egg donors is that most egg donor 
programs maintain an upper age limit of 35. In the UK, only 41,6% of cycles (fresh and 
thawed combined) were performed in women below 35 years of age in 2010 (HFEA, 2012). 
For the same year, only one third of fresh embryo cycles were performed in women under 
35 in the US (SART, 2012). However, on average, more oocytes are harvested from younger 
women, which means that they are more likely to have spare oocytes compared to their 
older counterparts, which is for example reflected in the fact that in thawed embryo 
cycles the number of women below 35 rises to 50% (for the US). Also, the younger the 
patient is, the more likely she is to conceive on her first attempt (SART, 2012; HFEA, 2012), 
which again makes it a plausible assumption that women below 35 are more likely to have 
spare oocytes left at the end of their treatment than IVF patients above 35. Nevertheless, 
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in countries where paid donation is the norm, the average age of current – paid – donors 
is likely to be significantly lower than the expected average age at which spare oocyte 
donors will have had their oocytes harvested, which makes paid donors more attractive 
candidates for recipients, as the recipients will have a better chance of conceiving with 
younger eggs. A trade-off will thus need to be made between the practical and ethical 
advantages of using spare oocytes on the one hand and better success rates when 
recruiting healthy young donors on the other hand. An additional factor to be considered 
will undoubtedly be the cost. As we will discuss below, spare oocytes are likely to be the 
cheaper option, which will make it attractive even in those places where there is no 
shortage. The future will tell if this will lead to a shift from fresh to frozen spare embryos 
or if this will lead to an increase in the demand, as it may open up the option of donor 
conception for a range of patients who are currently unable to afford the costs involved 
in donor recruitment and donor compensation. 
6.4 Reimbursement 
Whether or not donors should receive financial compensation for anything other than 
out-of-pocket expenses has been a much debated issue for several years (Dickenson, 2009; 
ESHRE Task Force on Ethics and Law, 2007; Ethics Committee of the ASRM, 2007; Flower, 
2010; Gazvani et al, 1997; Hyun, 2006; Johnston, 2006; Levine, 2010; Mertes and Pennings, 
2007; Steinbock, 2004; Thompson, 2007). Although most donors indicate altruism as their 
prime motivation to donate oocytes, it cannot be denied that the offer of money to offset 
physical discomfort and time investment or the price cut for patients in egg sharing 
programs (which accounted for half of the total number of donated oocytes in 2010 in the 
UK) serve as important incentives (Lindheim et al, 2001; Pennings and Devroey, 2006; 
Purewal and van den Akker, 2009; HFEA, 2012). Some authors have argued that one should 
steer clear of such incentives, fearing that they might lead to commodification of oocytes, 
undue inducement and/or exploitation of financially deprived women (Dickenson, 2009). 
Although we have previously questioned the validity of these objections and defended 
limited reimbursements, it is interesting to consider whether the prospect of spare 
oocytes becoming available for donation might render this debate superfluous all 
together (Mertes and Pennings, 2007). In this regard, it is interesting to compare the 
donation of spare oocytes to the donation of spare embryos by former IVF patients who 
have decided they no longer need those embryos for themselves. To our knowledge, these 
donors are not retrospectively compensated for the financial or physical investment in 
the creation of their embryos and this custom goes unquestioned. There are several 
possible explanations for this.  
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First, as the time when the investments are made and the time of the donation are usually 
several years apart, even a partial reimbursement at the time of donation would make the 
embryo donation look more like an embryo sale (Robertson, 1995). Even though an offer 
of compensation might be inspired by laudable principles such as reciprocity or a just 
distribution of the costs by all the beneficiaries, it may still be perceived by the donors as 
offensive and of actually devaluing their gift.  
Second, when someone gives something away that she no longer needs, it is not obvious 
in common social practice that the receiver of the gift ought to compensate the cost or 
efforts that were originally invested in creating or obtaining the gift. Of course, it is not 
immoral to ask money for a second hand car, especially if it was never used by the original 
owner, but note that that is a case in which an item is sold, meaning that an amount of 
money is offered that equals the financial value of the car (as determined by supply and 
demand). Embryos fall outside this economic realm and cannot be exchanged for money. 
Therefore, the only possible justification for compensation of embryo donors would have 
to be based on establishing a just, proportional distribution of the costs (both financial 
and in terms of time and effort) and benefits. This is the rationale that also underlies egg 
sharing programs, in which a women shares her oocytes with another woman, who in 
turn contributes to the costs of the donor’s IVF treatment (and thus the ovarian 
stimulation and oocyte pickup of which she also profits). However, this paradigm is not 
applicable for embryo donation as the original intention is a morally relevant difference 
between the two cases. We can use the analogies of hitchhiking and carpooling to 
demonstrate this claim and to answer the question of reimbursement. In the context of 
hitchhiking, a person takes her car to go to a certain destination. During the trip, she 
picks up another person who has the same destination. It is part of the practice of 
hitchhiking that the car driver does not ask for money. Gratuity is a constitutive rule of 
hitchhiking. Carpooling is essentially different. Here two people want to go to the same 
destination but they make an agreement beforehand that the person who drives will 
receive compensation for the costs that she makes (the gasoline bill will for example be 
split in half). The rules make perfect sense within the practices. The hitchhiker is not 
willing or unable to pay for the trip and accepts the uncertainty about whether being 
picked up, timing etc. The car driver is free to decide whether or not to go and when, to 
pick up the hitchhiker or not, depending on whether she wants company or whatever. 
The car-pooling passenger, however, knows when and how she will travel but she has to 
pay a certain amount for that certainty. The driving party in the carpooling commits 
herself to driving at a certain time etc. An IVF patient who underwent the treatment for 
herself, without making any commitments to future candidate-recipients of a possible 
surplus, and then asks for reimbursement at the end would make the same mistake as a 
car driver who picks up a hitchhiker and asks for a contribution. These patients want to 
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have all the advantages of the uncommitted car driver and the advantages of cost sharing 
in a carpooling-system.  
Egg sharing or other existing forms of fresh oocyte donation follow the car-pooling 
scenario, the donor and the receiver set out on a joint project together and decide 
beforehand that they will share the costs and benefits (or that the receiver will offset the 
investments made by the donor by a financial compensation). When spare embryos are 
donated, the donors originally made their investments only to their own benefit. We 
could argue that it would be nice if recipients of a donor embryo would show their 
gratitude, and many infertile patients might be willing to sacrifice a great deal of money 
for the chance of carrying a baby to term, but this does not imply that the donors have a 
legitimate claim to demand a compensation for the time and effort they have invested in 
the creation of the donated embryo. A more complicated situation would arise in a 
scenario in which the donors are still paying off the debt they incurred in pursuing IVF 
treatment at the time when they donate their spare embryos. If the embryo recipients 
would propose to help them settle this debt, we might be more inclined to look upon this 
as not merely a nice gesture, but as a fair distribution of the costs, as in this case the 
financial investment is still ongoing. Also, in this case there would be less ambiguity about 
whether the receiver is reimbursing expenses or purchasing an embryo. 
However, as a general rule, we can state that embryo donors are not compensated for the 
investments that were necessary to create their embryos, due to concerns over 
commodification of embryos and the fact that it is not common social practice to 
compensate people for the investments that they made for their own benefit when they 
allow a third person to share the benefits. When the donation of spare oocytes is 
concerned, the same considerations come into play. If enough women come forward as 
spare oocyte donors (and in this case one can be sure that the donation is ‘truly’ 
altruistic), there would no longer be a need to attract donors by means of financial 
incentives and thus the ongoing ethical debate about this issue can potentially come to 
an end. An important reservation that needs to be made is that in those countries where 
donor compensation is currently common practice and especially where donor 
compensations vary significantly depending on donor characteristics, a market for paid 
donation will persist for those patients who are only willing to accept fresh oocytes, or 
oocytes from donors with specific traits. In countries where donor compensation is not 
the norm and that currently rely on egg sharing programs, these programs are likely to 
become less appealing as using spare frozen oocytes will become a cheaper, less 
burdensome and less controversial alternative. On a negative note, this also implies that 
the women who are now only able to afford IVF treatment thanks to these egg sharing 
programs, will no longer be able to fulfil their child wish. 
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6.5   Oocytes cryopreserved in anticipation of age related 
fertility decline  
Let us now turn our attention to the women opting for AGE banking as potential oocyte 
donors. Nekkebroeck et al. (2010) reported that in their clinic, from the women who opt 
for oocyte cryopreservation for non-medical reasons, 13,3% have the intention to donate 
them to another woman if they would not need their oocytes themselves, an additional 
26,7% was undecided. Hodes-Wertz et al report that 11% of the women they surveyed 
would be willing to donate their oocytes for infertility treatment (Hodes-Wertz et al, 
2013). While there are no data yet on whether these women actually follow through on 
their intentions and while the group of women cryopreserving oocytes for age related 
fertility decline is still small, we should also take this group into consideration as 
potential spare oocyte donors. Currently, as already mentioned, the average age of 
women resorting to AGE banking is 37-38 years. Considering that most oocyte donation 
programs have an upper age limit for the donor of 35, a number of the spare oocytes from 
this source will either not be eligible for donation, or will only be accepted if there is a 
substantial donor oocyte shortage. However, as far as oocytes younger than 35 years old 
are concerned, the donation of these oocytes would have the same practical advantages 
as donation by (former) IVF patients and would be largely uncontroversial.  
As for IVF patients, we argue that these women should not be compensated for the time 
and effort invested in obtaining and storing their oocytes, as this was done for self-
interested reasons, not on the receiver’s behalf. However, both public opinion and the 
donors themselves may be more open to the offer of compensation for the actual costs 
that were incurred to obtain and store these oocytes in the context of AGE banking than 
in the context of ‘regular’ IVF. Women who freeze eggs in anticipation of future infertility 
but who eventually do not use them themselves, may not look upon them as a surplus 
that remains unused, but rather as a (bad) investment. This is somewhat different for IVF 
patients, who are more likely to perceive the costs they made as the price for fertility 
treatment as a whole and the spare oocytes as a by-product of that undertaking. The 
former will perceive the costs as the price they paid to generate these eggs and will feel 
that they did not get a return on their investment, making them more open to the option 
of recuperating some of their expenses. This perception may be flawed to a certain extent. 
When one buys an insurance policy against hurricane damage during a 10 year period and 
no damage is suffered in that time frame, one might say that there was no return on the 
investment made. However, during those 10 years, those who bought the insurance had 
a certain ‘peace of mind’ that those without the insurance did not have and they did not 
have to put other investments on hold in order to be able to cope with the costs that a 
hurricane might inflict. One cannot sufficiently point out that oocyte cryopreservation – 
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unlike insurance coverage – is an investment that is not even guaranteed to pay off if 
disaster (in this case infertility) does strike, but nevertheless, women who resort to AGE 
banking can be said to benefit from a similar peace of mind, not in the sense that they are 
certain to have children in the future, but rather in the sense that the option of 
parenthood is not yet completely gone. Also taking away the pressure of finding a partner 
to reproduce with fast is reported by many women as a reason to resort to AGE banking 
(Stoop et al, 2015) At the time when a woman makes the investment to cryopreserve her 
eggs, she knows that there is only a chance that she will eventually establish a pregnancy 
using these eggs, not a guarantee, and yet she esteems at that point that the price is not 
too high for the gamble that she is taking.  
In short, a women who stores oocytes for autologous use and decides to donate them later 
on cannot make a legitimate claim on the recipients of her oocytes to offset the financial 
investment that she made to obtain and store them. At the time when the investment was 
made, this was done for self-interested reasons and the decision to make the investment 
was not influenced by the future recipients. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that there 
may be a greater margin for acceptance of compensation for these donors rather than for 
IVF patients who donate spare oocytes. Although the donor cannot claim compensation, 
the offer of compensation is not immoral as it can be grounded in principles of 
reciprocity, just distribution of costs and benefits, or gratitude. An exception to this rule 
would be women who donate spare oocytes the collection of which they did not finance 
themselves. This might occur  in the case of company-sponsored egg banking, egg 
banking covered by health insurance or when a combination is made of donation to 
others and egg banking for autologous use, whereby the donor did not contribute in the 
costs. 
6.6 Freeze and share 
This brings us to another way in which an overlap is created between the practice of AGE 
banking and oocyte donation in countries faced with a donor oocyte shortage. Rather 
than donating oocytes that were frozen for self-use, but that remain in storage due to 
circumstances, oocytes can also be donated immediately at the time of freezing in a new 
form of egg sharing, making extra oocytes available today, rather than in a few years time. 
The idea of ‘freeze and share’ arrangements was developed at the London Bridge Fertility, 
Gynaecology and Genetics Centre and offers a way for women to offset the costs of 
retrieval and storage. Women are eligible to participate in the freeze and share program 
if they are “fit, healthy and under 35” and if they are likely to respond to relatively low 
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doses of fertility drugs. They undergo three treatment cycles over a 12 month period and 
the mature eggs of suitable quality that are obtained are equally divided between the 
donor and the recipient. The donor does not need to pay for the cost of oocyte retrieval 
and gets free storage for 5 years (Atalla, 2008). At first sight this is a win-win-situation. 
First, women who cannot afford to pay for the oocyte cryopreservation procedure are 
now able to benefit from this new technology. Second, in areas faced with an oocyte 
shortage, more oocyte will become available so that more women will be able to receive 
donor oocytes.  
However, this arrangement is not commended by everyone: “In the ‘freeze and share’ 
scheme, vulnerable women as they approach their mid-30s are being encouraged to put 
their faith in a storage technique with as yet unproven efficacy in the hand of a clinic 
offering storage in exchange for eggs to donate to other women. These women may then 
delay childbearing, become infertile, not conceive with their own stored eggs and know 
that a woman or women conceived with the fresh eggs they donated some years 
previously” (Parsons, 2008). This concern for the psychological ramifications for women 
entering into a freeze and share agreement have also been voiced in the context of egg 
sharing by IVF patients in order to get free or discounted treatment. As the system implies 
that women donate before they know whether they will eventually become mothers 
themselves, they should receive counselling about possible feelings of regret if it turns 
out that the recipients became mothers while they may not. However, in the egg sharing 
context, it has been shown that this is a concern for a minority of the women (Ahuja et 
al, 1998), and most patients perceive the arrangements as a win-win procedure (Blyth, 
2004).  
Other objections to egg sharing are that the donors’ consent is not free from outside 
pressure as their options are often limited by financial considerations (Englert, 1996), that 
egg sharing might lead to “a general erosion of social altruism” and that it represents a 
de facto commercialisation of human gametes (Johnson, 1999). Freeze and share 
programs are likely to be challenged with those same objections. All these objections can 
be brought back to the fact that a large percentage of egg sharers are indeed motivated 
by the benefit in kind that they receive, rather than by altruism. A report by the Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics (2011) stresses that the reward of egg sharing should not be 
perceived as payment, but as ‘the opportunity to bear a child’, but the fact remains that 
the decision to enter into an egg sharing scheme is often contingent upon the (lack of) 
financial resources of the IVF patient. A study by Pennings and Devroey (2006) shows that 
in Belgium, the number of egg sharers decreased with 70% after full reimbursement for 6 
IVF cycles was installed. This indicates that the success of egg sharing is to a large extent 
a consequence of unequal access to healthcare services, which is ethically troubling. 
However, while this is a strong argument to plead for public funding of IVF, we believe it 
is not a strong argument to ban the practice of egg sharing in places where public IVF-
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funding is not available. The fact that a number of – admittedly financially deprived – 
women opt for egg sharing, means that for them, in their particular situation, this is the 
best option. Taking this option away does not empower them, but limits their freedom 
even further.  
For freeze and share, the objection that the scheme takes advantage of the precarious 
situation of women who desperately want IVF, is less convincing than for ‘traditional’ egg 
sharing, as there is less urgency in this case. Egg sharers need ART treatment and they 
need it now, while ‘egg freezers’ are storing eggs for possible future use. In other words, 
the pressure on women who want to freeze eggs is less strong and they will be in a better 
position to think through all the pro’s and con’s. For these women, sharing eggs will be 
less of ‘an offer they can’t refuse’ than for infertility patients. However, the peculiar 
position that these women are in, does require an extra effort on the level of counselling. 
Women who consider to participate in a freeze and share program not only need to be 
informed about the practical aspects of the oocyte retrieval procedure, but also about the 
psychological impact of egg donation, the effect on their own chances of conceiving and 
about the limitations of oocyte cryostorage as a fertility preservation measure in general.  
6.7 Donating for research 
A number of the difficulties that were outlined for both IVF patients and AGE bankers do 
not apply if oocytes are donated for research purposes. First and most importantly, as the 
oocytes donated to research do not result in offspring, the psychological burden is largely 
absent. One cannot be confronted with an unknown child in search of its genetic mother 
and neither does one have to wonder about who this unknown child may be and under 
which circumstances it will grow up. If both this psychological barrier to donate oocytes 
and the physical barrier of having to undergo ovarian stimulation and oocyte retrieval do 
not apply (as the oocytes are already in storage), we would expect a large number of 
women to donate their unused oocytes to research when given the option. This 
expectation is reinforced by empirical data showing that donation for research is the 
preferred disposition option for spare embryos (Lyerly and Faden, 2007; Provoost et al, 
2012), which is explained by the observation that IVF patients in general do not want their 
embryos (and the efforts involved in creating them) to go to waste, but at the same time 
have difficulties with the idea of having a genetic child growing up in a different family 
(Provoost et al, 2009). As a general indication, Nekkebroeck et al (2010) and Hodes-Wertz 
et al (2013) report that respectively 46,7% and 63% of AGE bankers would be willing to 
donate ‘leftover’ oocytes to research. This new source of human oocytes for research 
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would not only be easily accessible for researchers, it would also stir much less 
commotion in the general population and in regulatory bodies than the use of oocytes 
from donors who would have to go through hormone stimulation and oocyte pick-up for 
the purpose of donation. Until now, the recruitment of research donors has been very 
difficult and ethical concerns have been repeatedly voiced (Mertes & Pennings, 2007). The 
procedure of oocyte donation is deemed to be disproportionately burdensome in 
comparison to the possible scientific benefits, there are concerns about the fact that those 
who donate do not represent the part of society that is most likely to benefit from the 
research and there are concerns about informed consent (Beeson and Lippman, 2006; 
George, 2007; Magnus and Cho, 2005). While financial incentives to donate have been 
accepted in some jurisdictions, they have been outlawed by others. In the scenario where 
spare oocytes are donated (from either of the three sources described above), there is no 
longer a causal tie between the decision to donate and the hardship involved in the oocyte 
retrieval procedure, which renders most of the objections to research donation 
superfluous. Moreover, in this scenario, chances of recruiting a sufficient number of 
donors without offering financial compensation are much higher than in the current 
situation. 
Finally, some of the concerns related to the freeze and share program would not apply if 
the oocytes donated under such a scheme are donated for research instead of infertility 
treatments. For instance, the concern regarding the psychological burden on women who 
remain childless in the knowledge that another woman may have a child resulting from 
her oocytes, would not apply. An egg sharing program in which IVF patients agree to 
donate half of their oocytes for research in return for a 50% discount on their IVF 
treatment was approved in 2006 for the UK’s Newcastle University and is not considered 
as exploitative by the participants (Newcastle University Press Office, 2006; Haimes et al, 
2012). A similar program for women who want to store eggs for future use (instead of 
access to IVF treatment) is probably even less controversial as these women are in a less 
precarious situation. Whether the costs of a ‘freeze and research’ scheme should be 
divided 50/50 between donor and recipient, as in the Newcastle University’s egg sharing 
scheme (for IVF patients and researchers) or if the researcher should pay the full cost, as 
in the Bridge Centre’s freeze and share scheme (for social freezers and IVF patients) is 
debatable. However, this question may be irrelevant in practice if our hypothesis that 
spare oocytes will become available at no added cost for research institutes holds true, as 
in this case, there will be no need to rely on egg sharing schemes. 
On a critical note, we must concede that some researchers may not be too keen on using 
oocytes that have been subjected to vitrification or slow freezing, as these manipulations 
may constitute a confounding factor in their research data. However, this may not be an 
issue for all types of research. 
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6.8 Conclusion 
In conclusion, as a side-effect of the ability to freeze oocytes in a safe and effective way, 
we anticipate that more oocytes will become available for donation from a variety of 
sources. Oocytes may be frozen for different reasons and as the years pass by, a part of 
them will remain unused by the woman for whom they were originally stored. It is 
reasonable to expect that if the option is presented, many of these oocytes will be directed 
to research and these new kinds of donations will put an end to most – if not all – of the 
practical hurdles and ethical concerns regarding oocyte donation for research purposes, 
even the issue of financial reimbursement. Thus, the ongoing ethical debate surrounding 
’research donation’ may finally be quelled. 
Although the effect may be less prominent, there will probably also be a positive effect 
on the number of oocytes donated to IVF patients. While some particular scenarios 
require special attention, the donation of spare oocytes for third party reproduction 
offers more benefits than problems. The most controversial development are the freeze 
and share arrangements, whereby women who donate oocytes to IVF patients get free 
storage of half of the retrieved number of eggs for (future) autologous use. If, as a result 
of the donation of spare oocytes, there is a sufficient increase in donor oocytes to 
accommodate the present demand, these arrangements are likely to be abandoned again. 
Nonetheless, in countries where egg sharing between IVF patients is currently allowed, 
freeze and share agreements – if accompanied by careful counselling – should also be 
allowed. 
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Conclusion 
This dissertation set out to answer four normative questions, or at least to shed a light on 
the main ethical issues associated with each of them: 
 Should we freeze the eggs of women who fear that age-related fertility decline will 
interfere with their reproductive plans? (chapters 1 and 2) 
 How should we freeze eggs for these women? (chapter 3) 
 Who should pay the bill? (chapters 4 and 5) 
 Can egg banking also be considered as a solution to ethical problems in the context 
of egg donation? (chapter 6) 
So how far have we come in answering them? 
 
Should we freeze healthy women’s eggs?  
The original opposition to egg banking for healthy women – as opposed to the prototype 
case of egg banking by women faced with gonadotoxic cancer treatment – was largely 
based on bad arguments (e.g. “we should respect the natural limits of female fertility”, 
“reproduction should not be medicalized”, “the experimental status of oocyte 
vitrification is a reason to withhold it from healthy women, but not from diseased 
women”), false premises (e.g. “women want to freeze their eggs to advance their careers”, 
“egg banking will have a detrimental effect on society”) and stereotyping (e.g. “women 
who want to postpone motherhood are selfish”, “women who want to postpone 
motherhood are victims of a male-oriented society”). Moreover, the dichotomy between 
‘medical egg freezing’ and ‘non-medical’ or ‘social egg freezing’ is not straightforward at 
all, which is why I have attempted to avoid this terminology as much as possible in this 
dissertation. For example, in which category would we place a woman with a family 
history of early menopause? Or a woman who has undergone cancer treatment 20 years 
earlier and now wants to bank eggs, fearing premature ovarian failure? It is not the case 
that woman faced with gonadotoxic treatment will be sterile the day after treatment, 
whereas ‘AGE bankers’ remain fertile for years to come. In fact, in many instances the 
former will have more fertile years ahead of them than the latter (see also Mertes, 2015). 
Taking this into account, the ASRM’s statement that women whose fertility is threatened 
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by disease or medical treatments have no other options besides freezing their eggs, while 
healthy women do have other options is misleading (ASRM, 2007). It appears that there 
are few morally significant differences left between women whose fertility is threatened 
by disease and women whose fertility is threatened by aging which would permit a 
differential treatment. As a basic rule, like cases should be treated alike. Therefore, it is 
inconsistent to allow egg banking in the context of oncofertility, but not in the context of 
AGE banking. 
One might still conclude, however, that equal treatment of both cases means that egg 
banking in the context of oncofertility should be abolished. However, given the advances 
made in the efficiency and safety of oocyte vitrification (at least until further notice, as 
long term follow-up still needs to be gathered), I conclude that there is no principled 
reason why women should be denied access to egg banking. Nevertheless, there are some 
legitimate ethical concerns linked to AGE banking, which brings us to the second 
question. 
 
How should we offer AGE banking?  
It is important to make AGE banking available to those women who have the highest 
chance of benefiting from it, while discouraging its use by women who are unlikely to 
benefit. The ideal candidate for AGE banking would be a 34 year old woman who is not in 
a (stable) relationship, or in a relationship in which parenthood is not (yet) an option and 
who has a conditional desire for parenthood (that is, parenthood is desired within certain 
side constraints such as a dedicated partner, financial stability etc.). Moreover, this 
woman would have to be well-informed about the limitations of the possibilities of 
establishing a pregnancy and reaching a healthy live birth, about the efforts, discomforts 
and risks involved and about the costs associated with obtaining a sufficient number of 
oocytes, storing them and using them afterwards. Also, she should be free from outside 
pressure (for example from her employer). In the ideal scenario, AGE banking should be 
considered as a plan B in case future attempts at natural conception fail: a plan B that has 
a chance of success, but that is not a guarantee for success. Women who inquire about 
AGE banking at a very young age, arguing that they will postpone parenthood to build a 
successful career first, should be stimulated to consider whether there will be more or 
less room for raising children ten or fifteen years down the road once they have landed 
that perfect job they are now aiming for and whether or not they are willing to gamble 
their odds of being able to establish a family. Finally, women who inquire about AGE 
banking at a point when they are very close to being infertile should be counselled 
properly about their individual chances of success. For many of those women, AGE 
banking will be a desperate measure with a very small chance of success, rather than a 
plan B with a reasonable chance of success. It is important to be aware of the fact that 
many women have reported to be happy about their decision to bank eggs, even if they 
think that the chances that they will ever use them are slim. For many women the loss of 
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their fertility may come very suddenly, and egg banking may give them the time to come 
to terms with that new reality. At the same time, the psychological argument only goes 
that far. If in a couple of years from now, it would turn out that very few women come 
back to use their banked oocytes, psychological support and counselling might be the 
preferential treatment option for women at the verge of losing their fertility, rather than 
AGE banking. As always, one option does not exclude the other. 
 
Who should pay the bill? 
Different conceptions of distributive justice and different conceptions of the goals and 
duties of public healthcare lead to different answers to this question. In my analysis of 
this issue, I have started from current practice in healthcare coverage of fertility 
treatment and argued for consistency. Starting from a context in which several cycles of 
IVF treatment are covered by public healthcare, also when the cause of infertility is 
reproductive aging, at least the second part of the intervention – thawing and fertilising 
the oocytes and replacing the resulting embryos – ought to be covered by public 
healthcare. This is not a controversial claim: these women would be equally subfertile or 
infertile than other IVF patients by then but rather than being treated with their own 
aged oocytes or donor oocytes they could be treated with their own young oocytes. The 
counterargument that these women purposefully delayed parenthood and are therefore 
accountable for their misfortune is not convincing, as was extensively discussed in this 
dissertation. 
A more difficult question then, is whether or not the first part of the intervention – the 
collection and storage of oocytes – should be publicly funded or become part of standard 
healthcare insurance policies covering fertility treatment. In terms of resource 
allocation, it is important to know whether this approach would be more or less cost-
effective than current practice, that is: treating reproductively speaking older women 
with their own oocytes with low chances of success and/or with donor oocytes with 
better chances of success (oftentimes in successive order). The cost-effectiveness studies 
that are currently available provide conflicting information. Also, such an analysis is 
never value-free, as one will also have to decide which investment is acceptable for each 
additional live birth. The most problematic unknown factor, however, is how many 
women will return to use their eggs. For AGE banking to be a sound investment of the 
healthcare budget, many women will have to return or donate their eggs to other women. 
Follow-up of the women who have banked their eggs in recent years will shed a light on 
this in the years to come. The flipside of not incorporating AGE banking in public 
healthcare or standard insurance packages, is that it remain inaccessible for large groups 
of women. Rather than giving a definite advise for or against public funding, I concluded 
that the local context is decisive in determining which approach is most consistent with 
current policies regarding reproductive health. 
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Another option is that employers offer egg banking to their female employees as a perk 
or (health) benefit. I argued that for these policies to be truly empowering (which they 
are claimed to be), a substantial number of conditions would have to be fulfilled, which 
are however difficult to fulfil. Women would have to be properly informed about the 
benefits, risks and limitations, feel no pressure to take up the offer (whether or not a 
woman banks her eggs should thus not have any influence on her career opportunities) 
and the offer should be accompanied by family-friendly policies. As the offer itself may 
already be considered to be a form of pressure, it is wiser not to offer egg banking to 
employees. 
Can egg banking also be considered as a solution to ethical problems in the context of egg donation? 
In the final part of the dissertation, I hypothesized how egg banking may not only incite, 
but also solve ethical concerns, namely in the context of oocyte donation. Egg donation 
is controversial because it separates genetic from gestational and social motherhood and 
because it incites concerns over the wellbeing of the egg donors. If women would be 
willing to donate their banked eggs (either for research or for fertility treatment) after 
deciding they no longer need them for their own reproductive purposes, then this would 
be a less controversial source of egg cells than current forms of egg donation in which a 
woman’s ovaries are stimulated with the sole intent of donating and in which women are 
oftentimes paid for their donation, which raises concern over exploitation and 
commodification of body material. Women may also decide to combine egg donation and 
egg banking for autologous use in a system similar to egg sharing agreements between 
IVF patients. In this case, original concerns over pressure to donate remain largely intact. 
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Appendix 1: English summary 
Should we freeze healthy women’s eggs? 
Chapter 1: The portrayal of healthy women requesting oocyte 
cryopreservation 
The possibility to cryopreserve oocytes to be used in IVF treatment later in life has not 
only enlarged the reproductive options of cancer patients who are faced with 
gonadotoxic treatments, but also holds the promise of enlarging the reproductive options 
of healthy women whose personal circumstances (most often the absence of a partner) 
do not allow them to reproduce in their most fertile years. Opinions for and against this 
application of the cryopreservation technology are often based on different portrayals of 
the women who might use it. Three different portrayals can be discerned in the debate 
about the ethics of so-called ‘social egg freezing’ or ‘non medical egg freezing’. First, these 
women have been portrayed as selfish career-pursuing women. Second, healthy women 
who might benefit from oocyte cryopreservation have been portrayed as victims of a 
male-oriented society that makes it difficult for women to combine motherhood with a 
good education or professional responsibilities. Third, healthy women opting to 
cryopreserve oocytes have been portrayed as wise, proactive women who will not have 
to depend on oocyte donors should they suffer from age-related infertility by the time 
they are ready to reproduce. Each of these three portrayals has its own shortcomings that 
one should be wary of, as they lead to an oversimplification of the ethical debate. 
The first narrative is probably the furthest away from reality, as the age at which healthy 
women currently request oocyte cryopreservation indicates that ‘postponement’ of 
childbearing is seldom planned at a young age and thus that freezing oocytes is rather an 
emergency intervention than part of a well designed life plan to ‘have it all’. However, 
also the other two narratives are misrepresentations to a certain extent. Just as it is 
inaccurate to state that women choose to delay childbearing in order to advance their 
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careers, it is also inaccurate to say that they have no other option but to delay 
childbearing due to socio-economic conditions. When people have their children depends 
on an interplay between contextual factors and personal values and neither one will 
completely override the other. Finally, the image of smart, proactive women is rather an 
idealistic picture of who the best candidates would be than an accurate depiction of those 
who actually come forward. 
Chapter 2: Arguments for and against 
Despite the original opposition against AGE banking for healthy women, AGE banking has 
found its way to the clinic rather fast. One reason for this evolution may be that a number 
of the initial ethical objections to oocyte freezing for so-called ‘social’ or ‘non-medical’ 
reasons were not very convincing, especially given the contrast with the warm welcome 
oocyte banking received in the field of oncofertility. The arguments that we should not 
try to circumvent natural boundaries, solve societal problems with medical solutions or 
that AGE banking will have a negative impact on society are either flawed or only partially 
convincing. On the other side of the debate, the argument that we should allow AGE 
banking to combat gender inequality in terms of the maximal age at childbirth was 
dismissed, but the argument that women’s reproductive autonomy should be respected, 
that this technology may not only clinically, but also psychologically benefit patients and 
that it is inconsistent to support egg donation by others, but not autologous egg donation 
appear to carry some weight. 
How should we freeze healthy women’s eggs? 
Chapter 3: AGE banking for better, not for worse 
However, even if there are good arguments to bring AGE banking to the clinic, a cautious 
approach is warranted. The utility of the procedure may be low and women may be overly 
optimistic about their chances of conceiving after AGE banking. If the only candidates for 
AGE banking are women whose ovarian reserve is already at a critical threshold, then the 
utility of this procedure will be very low and women will be buying false hope at a high 
price. However, if women become more aware of the effect of aging on their fertility, of 
the possibility to store oocytes in their fertile years (preferably before age 35), of the 
limits of the procedure (especially when they are already over the age of 35) and of their 
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personal chances of success, oocyte cryopreservation may be a welcome intervention for 
women who long to preserve their fertility longer than they naturally could. 
Who pays the bill? 
Chapter 4: Public funding 
Although elective oocyte cryopreservation is being offered by an increasing number of 
fertility clinics, it is far from clear what its place is – or should be – within systems that 
offer a number of free IVF cycles. If women who have proactively cryopreserved their 
oocytes return for treatment at a point when they can no longer conceive naturally and 
have not reached the maximum age limit for embryo transfer, they should be treated on 
equal terms as other IVF patients and also receive free treatment. It is less 
straightforward, however, whether or not the covered cycles should include the first step 
of the procedure, namely the costs related to ovarian stimulation, oocyte retrieval, oocyte 
freezing (/vitrification) and storage. Although paying for elective procedures is 
counterintuitive, there may be good reasons to argue for full coverage from the onset in 
specific contexts. Alternatively, a cash back system or more free transfer cycles could be 
considered. The preferred strategy will often depend on local legal and contextual factors. 
Chapter 5: Company benefit 
Several companies have decided to offer egg banking to their employees. It is however 
unclear whether this will lead to more or less reproductive autonomy. For these policies 
to be truly empowering, a substantial number of conditions need to be fulfilled, which 
can be reduced to three categories. Company-sponsored egg freezing would be liberating 
if and only if (1) women understand the benefits, risks and – perhaps most importantly 
amidst the hype – limitations, (2) women feel no pressure to take up the offer (whether 
or not a woman banks her eggs should thus not have any influence on her career 
opportunities); (3) the offer has no negative effect on other family-friendly policies and 
is in fact accompanied by such policies. These conditions should lead to a situation in 
which (1) (on a personal level) only those women bank their eggs for whom – all things 
considered – this is their best available option of achieving the life goals that are most 
important to them personally (which should be very few women) and (2) (on a societal 
level) women remain free to have their children while they are young, without suffering 
serious professional setbacks. If companies take these requirements seriously, they will 
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have to invest a lot of time and effort in fulfilling them and many will argue that they are 
impossible to fulfil. Thus, regardless of companies’ possible good intentions, women’s 
reproductive autonomy is more often than not ill-served by offering them company-
sponsored AGE banking. 
Egg banker today, egg donor tomorrow? 
Chapter 6: Implications of oocyte cryostorage for the practice of oocyte 
donation 
In conclusion, as a side-effect of the ability to freeze oocytes in a safe and effective way, 
we anticipate that more oocytes will become available for donation from a variety of 
sources. Oocytes may be frozen for different reasons and as the years pass by, a part of 
them will remain unused by the woman for whom they were originally stored. It is 
reasonable to expect that if the option is presented, many of these oocytes will be directed 
to research and these new kinds of donations will put an end to most – if not all – of the 
practical hurdles and ethical concerns regarding oocyte donation for research purposes, 
even the issue of financial reimbursement. Thus, the ongoing ethical debate surrounding 
’research donation’ may finally be quelled. 
Although the effect may be less prominent, there will probably also be a positive effect 
on the number of oocytes donated to IVF patients. While some particular scenarios 
require special attention, the donation of spare oocytes for third party reproduction 
offers more benefits than problems. The most controversial development are the freeze 
and share arrangements, whereby women who donate oocytes to IVF patients get free 
storage of half of the retrieved number of eggs for (future) autologous use. If, as a result 
of the donation of spare oocytes, there is a sufficient increase in donor oocytes to 
accommodate the present demand, these arrangements are likely to be abandoned again. 
Nonetheless, in countries where egg sharing between IVF patients is currently allowed, 
freeze and share agreements – if accompanied by careful counselling – should also be 
allowed. 
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Appendix 2: Nederlandstalige samenvatting 
Moeten we eicellen van gezonde vrouwen invriezen? 
Hoofdstuk 1: De portrettering van gezonde vrouwen die hun eicellen 
wensen in te banken 
De mogelijkheid om eicellen in te vriezen om op een later moment te gebruiken in een 
IVF-behandeling opent perspectieven voor patiënten die worden geconfronteerd met een 
ziekte die hun vruchtbaarheid bedreigt of die gonadotoxische behandelingen dienen te 
ondergaan. Het opent echter evenzeer perspectieven voor vrouwen met een kinderwens 
die met lede ogen aanzien hoe ze het einde van hun vruchtbare jaren naderen terwijl ze 
niet in de juiste omstandigheden verkeren om zich aan het ouderschap te wagen (b.v. 
doordat ze nog geen geschikte levenspartner gevonden hebben). Meningen voor en tegen 
deze toepassing zijn vaak gebaseerd op verschillende portretteringen van de vrouwen die 
er mogelijk beroep op zouden doen. Men kan drie verschillende stereotypen 
onderscheiden: (1) egoïstische carrièrevrouwen, (2) slachtoffers van een door mannen 
gedomineerde maatschappij die het moeilijk maakt voor vrouwen om het moederschap 
te combineren met een degelijke opleiding en/of professionele verantwoordelijkheden, 
(3) verstandige, proactieve vrouwen die niet zullen moeten vertrouwen op donoreicellen 
wanneer ze geconfronteerd worden met leeftijdsgerelateerde onvruchtbaarheid op het 
moment waarop ze kinderen willen. Elk van deze stereotypen heeft tekortkomingen die 
leiden tot een verarming van het ethisch debat. 
Het eerste stereotype is wellicht het verst verwijderd van de werkelijkheid, vermits de 
leeftijd waarop vrouwen momenteel hun eicellen inbanken aangeeft dat het zelden gaat 
om een gepland uitstel van de kinderwens op jonge leeftijd. Integendeel, het inbanken 
van eicellen is eerder een paniekreactie dan een onderdeel van een minutieus uitgedacht 
plan om ‘alles te hebben’. De andere twee stereotypen stroken echter ook niet met de 
werkelijkheid. Net zoals het inaccuraat is te stellen dat vrouwen het krijgen van kinderen 
uitstellen om voorrang te geven aan hun carrière, is het ook inaccuraat te stellen dat ze 
geen andere optie zouden hebben door de socio-economische realiteit waarin ze leven. 
Het moment waarop mensen kinderen krijgen hangt af van een samenspel tussen 
verschillende contextuele factoren en persoonlijke waarden. Het beeld van de 
verstandige, proactieve vrouw is tenslotte een eerder idealistisch beeld van wie de beste 
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kandidate zou zijn om eicellen in te banken dan een waarheidsgetrouwe afspiegeling van 
degenen die er momenteel interesse in tonen. 
Hoofdstuk 2: Argumenten voor en tegen 
Ondanks de aanvankelijke tegenstand tegen het inbanken van eicellen voor gezonde 
vrouwen, heeft deze toepassing toch snel de weg naar de kliniek gevonden. Een mogelijke 
reden voor deze evolutie is dat een aantal van de oorspronkelijke ethische bezwaren die 
het zogenaamde ‘social egg freezing’ contrasteerden met het inbanken van eicellen (wat 
wel met open armen werd ontvangen) bij nader toezien niet overtuigend zijn gebleken. 
De argumenten dat we niet mogen ingaan tegen natuurlijke grenzen, dat 
maatschappelijke problemen niet aangepakt mogen worden met medische interventies 
of dat het inbanken van eicellen voor gezonde vrouwen een negatieve impact zou hebben 
op de maatschappij zijn weinig overtuigend gebleken. Aan de andere zijde van het debat 
houdt ook het argument dat het inbanken van eicellen genderongelijkheid tegengaat (in 
de zin dat de maximumleeftijd waarop mannen en vrouwen kinderen kunnen krijgen 
dichter bij elkaar zou komen te liggen) weinig steek, maar het argument dat de 
reproductieve autonomie van vrouwen gerespecteerd dient te worden, dat er niet enkel 
een klinisch, maar ook een psychologisch voordeel verbonden is aan het inbanken van 
eicellen en dat het inconsistent is eiceldonatie aan derden toe te staan, maar niet aan de 
toekomstige zelf, kunnen niet zo gemakkelijk aan de kant worden geschoven. 
Hoe moeten we eicellen van gezonde vrouwen invriezen? 
Hoofdstuk 3: Eicellen inbanken voor de toekomst: baat het niet dan 
schaadt het niet? 
Het feit dat er goede argumenten zijn om het inbanken van eicellen voor gezonde 
vrouwen toe te staan, neemt echter niet weg dat er aan bepaalde randvoorwaarden 
voldaan moet zijn om tot een ethisch verantwoorde klinische praktijk te komen. Het 
uiteindelijke nut van de procedure is mogelijk laag en vrouwen kunnen hun kansen op 
een kind na het inbanken van eicellen overschatten. Als de enige kandidates voor het 
inbanken van eicellen vrouwen zijn waarvan de ovariële reserve reeds zeer klein is, dan 
zal ook de kans op succes zeer klein zijn en kopen vrouwen valse hoop aan een hoge prijs. 
Als vrouwen in de toekomst echter beter geïnformeerd zouden worden over het effect 
van veroudering op hun vruchtbaarheid, over de mogelijkheid om eicellen in te banken 
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tijdens hun vruchtbare jaren (bij voorkeur voor de leeftijd van 35 jaar), over de limieten 
van de procedure (voornamelijk wanneer ze reeds ouder zijn dan 35) en over hun 
persoonlijke kans op succes, dan kan het inbanken van eicellen wel een dankbare 
interventie zijn voor vrouwen die een noodoplossing zoeken om hun vruchtbaarheid zo 
lang mogelijk te bewaren. 
Wie betaalt de rekening? 
Hoofdstuk 4: Publieke gezondheidszorg 
Hoewel een toenemend aantal vruchtbaarheidsklinieken het invriezen van eicellen 
aanbiedt, is het niet duidelijk wat de plaats er van is – of zou moeten zijn – binnen een 
systeem waarin de ziektekostenverzekering de kosten van verscheidene IVF-cycli op zich 
neemt. Wanneer vrouwen die eerder proactief eicellen hebben bewaard zich aanmelden 
voor een IVF-behandeling op het moment waarop ze niet langer vruchtbaar zijn (en nog 
niet de leeftijdsgrens voor IVF hebben bereikt), dan dienen ze op dezelfde manier 
behandeld te worden als andere IVF-patiënten en dient de ziektekostenverzekering 
eveneens de kost van de transfercycli op zich te nemen. Het is echter minder 
vanzelfsprekend of ook de eerste stap van de procedure, namelijk de kosten verbonden 
aan de ovariële stimulatie, pick-up, invriezen en bewaren van de eicellen, gedekt zou 
moeten worden door de gezondheidszorg. Er kunnen zowel voor als tegen dit idee goede 
argumenten naar voren worden gebracht. Mogelijke alternatieven zijn een cashback-
systeem of het aanbieden van extra transfercycli. Lokale wettelijke en contextuele 
factoren zijn bepalend voor welke aanpak het meest wenselijk is. 
Hoofdstuk 5: Bedrijfsvoordeel 
Verscheidene bedrijven hebben beslist om het inbanken van eicellen aan te bieden aan 
hun werkneemsters. Het is echter onduidelijk of dit tot meer, dan wel minder 
reproductieve autonomie zal leiden. Opdat dit aanbod de reproductieve vrijheid werkelijk 
zou verhogen, moet aan een aantal voorwaarden voldaan zijn. Ten eerste moeten 
geïnteresseerde werknemers de voordelen, risico’s en vooral de beperkingen van de 
ingreep begrijpen. Ten tweede mogen vrouwen onder geen beding druk ervaren om het 
aanbod op te nemen (het al dan niet inbanken van eicellen mag dus geen repercussies 
hebben voor haar carrièrekansen binnen het bedrijf). Ten derde mag het aanbod geen 
negatief effect hebben op andere gezinsvriendelijke maatregelen en moet het er zelfs 
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door geflankeerd worden. Deze voorwaarden zouden moeten leiden tot een situatie 
waarin (1) (op een persoonlijk vlak) enkel die vrouwen eicellen invriezen waarvoor – alles 
in beschouwing genomen – dit hun beste beschikbare optie om de levensdoelen te 
bereiken die voor hen persoonlijk het meest belangrijk zijn (wat in principe zeer weinig 
vrouwen zouden moeten zijn) en (2) (op een maatschappelijk niveau) vrouwen de vrijheid 
behouden om kinderen te krijgen op relatief jonge leeftijd zonder daarvan ernstige 
professionele nadelen te ondervinden. Als het al mogelijk is om aan deze voorwaarden te 
voldoen, dan zullen ze alleszins grote investeringen vergen van bedrijven. Ongeacht de 
goede intenties van sommige bedrijven, zal het aanbod om eicellen in te vriezen in de 
meerderheid van de gevallen geen positieve impact hebben op de reproductieve 
autonomie van de werkneemsters. 
De donoren van morgen 
Hoofdstuk 6: Implicaties van het invriezen van eicellen voor de huidige 
praktijk van eiceldonatie 
Als een neveneffect van de mogelijkheid om eicellen op een veilige en efficiënte manier 
in te vriezen, kan men vermoeden dat er meer eicellen beschikbaar zullen worden voor 
donatie uit verschillende bronnen. Eicellen kunnen om verschillende redenen worden 
ingebankt en met het verstrijken van de jaren, zullen een heel aantal ervan niet worden 
gebruikt door de vrouwen die ze hebben ingevroren. Wanneer deze vrouwen de optie 
krijgen om hun eicellen te doneren voor wetenschappelijke of reproductieve doeleinden, 
dan is de kans groot dat velen onder hen hiertoe bereid zullen zijn. Vooral op het gebied 
van onderzoek zou dit een bron van eicellen zijn zonder de praktische en ethische 
problemen die vandaag verbonden zijn aan eiceldonatie, met inbegrip van het probleem 
van de financiële vergoeding. 
Hoewel het meest waarschijnlijke scenario is dat minder vrouwen zullen doneren voor 
reproductie dan voor onderzoek, kunnen we toch ook positief effect verwachten op de 
beschikbaarheid van donoreicellen voor fertiliteitsbehandelingen. Ook in deze context 
zijn er minder ethische bezorgdheden verbonden aan de donatie van ‘overgebleven’ 
eicellen dan aan de huidige praktijk van eiceldonatie. De meest controversiële 
ontwikkeling zijn de ‘freeze and share’ constructies, waarbij vrouwen die eicellen 
doneren aan IVF patiënten als tegenprestatie ook de helft van de verkregen eicellen voor 
eigen gebruik kunnen inbanken. Het is mogelijk dat wanneer binnen enkele jaren 
ingevroren eicellen beginnen vrijkomen (bv van vrouwen die de wettelijke leeftijdslimiet 
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voor een IVF-behandeling hebben overschreden), er geen nood meer zal zijn aan ‘freeze 
and share’ overeenkomsten. Dit neemt echter niet weg dat er geen reden is om dit soort 
contracten niet toe te staan in landen waar momenteel ook ‘egg sharing’ tussen IVF-
patiënten wordt toegestaan, hoewel dit steeds in combinatie moet gebeuren met 
voldoende counseling. 
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